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IMAGINING A MORE HUMANE IMMIGRATION POLICY IN THE
AGE OF OBAMA: THE USE OF PLENARY POWER TO HALT THE
STATE BALKANIZATION OF IMMIGRATION REGULATION

KRISTINA M. CAMPBELL*
INTRODUCTION
The first decade of the twenty-first century has been grim for immigrants
to the United States—both legal and undocumented—and the lawyers and
advocates who work on their behalf. Following the failure of comprehensive
immigration reform at the federal level, states and municipalities have seen fit
to take matters into their own hands and pass a patchwork of local ordinances,
statutes, and ballot initiatives ostensibly designed to do what the federal
government had failed to do—regulate the flow of immigration into their cities
and towns. As the economy continues to spiral downward into what may very
well be the next Great American depression, the impact of immigrants to the
United States on our economy and the benefits and burdens of their presence
continues to be the source of great debate.
With the election of President Barack Obama—himself the son of an
immigrant—immigrants’ rights advocates were hopeful that the new
Administration would not only reject the George W. Bush Administration’s
interpretation of immigration policy—which took a permissive view toward
the ability of state and local governments to regulate immigration—but that the
Obama Administration would also urge Congress to pass comprehensive
immigration reform that reflects a more just and humane approach toward
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College, 1997; J.D., Notre Dame Law School, 2002. I would like to thank Professor Don Smith
at the University of Denver Sturm College of Law, and Judge David Edward, formerly of the
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Fall 2009 Immigration Law class at the University of Denver the development of the doctrine of
freedom of movement within the European Union and how such a concept might apply to
immigration law and policy in the United States. I would also like to thank Dean Kevin R.
Johnson, Professor of Law and Chicana/o Studies, and Mabie-Apallas Public Interest Law Chair,
University of California, Davis, School of Law for his assistance and helpful comments; Cynthia
Valenzuela, Director of Litigation at the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund
(MALDEF), and Nancy Ramirez, Western Regional Counsel at MALDEF, for their mentorship,
guidance, and friendship; and my parents, Jerry and Virginia Campbell, for their love, patience,
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immigrants and their legal and social integration into our society overall.
However, with the installation of former Arizona Governor Janet Napolitano as
Secretary of Homeland Security, early indications are that the Obama
Administration is embracing the immigration policies of the Bush
Administration, with an emphasis on enforcement-only policies at the federal
level and the continuing delegation of immigration regulation to state and local
governments. This policy not only undermines the principles of immigration
federalism that is mandated by our Constitution, it further blurs the line
between federal and state authority to regulate immigration. As such, any
attempts to achieve meaningful comprehensive immigration reform will be
fatal unless Congress and the Executive forcefully reassert the federal
government’s supremacy over immigration matters.
This Article argues for the reassertion of Congress’s plenary power to
regulate immigration, and examines the possibilities for radical change in
immigration policy that are presented to us as we close out the first decade of
the twenty-first century and begin looking toward the next. Part I provides an
overview of the rise of state and local anti-immigrant laws in the wake of
Congress’s failure to pass comprehensive immigration reform—as well as
examining how Latinos and immigrants’ rights advocates have worked to
combat these measures through litigation and other means—and the concurrent
anti-immigrant sentiment that has gained momentum across the United States
in recent years. Part II discusses how the Bush Administration undermined the
principles of immigration federalism by combining enforcement-only
immigration policies at the federal level with the improper delegation of other
aspects of immigration control to states and localities- in particular the
increasing reliance on the 287(g) program—and how the federal government’s
reliance on these policies have not only undermined federal supremacy to
regulate immigration, but has given rise to racial profiling and an increase in
hate crimes toward immigrants and Latinos.
Part III discusses Congress’s plenary power to regulate immigration, and
argues that the political branches must act now to reinforce the principle of
immigration federalism as a matter of both law and policy. I argue that
because the Constitution requires the federal government to maintain a uniform
system of immigration laws, Congress must act now and enact truly
comprehensive immigration reform that clearly and forcefully sets limits on
the ability of state and local governments to regulate immigration. In
particular, Congress and the Executive have the power and the ability—and
indeed, the obligation—to step in and halt the piecemeal enforcement of
immigration on the state and federal level, thus putting an end to the
“balkanization” of immigration law that has occurred at a rapid and frightening
pace over the last several years. Additionally, by asserting the powers given to
Congress and the Executive to create and enforce our nation’s immigration
regulations, the Obama Administration also has the opportunity to stem the
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tide of anti-immigrant and anti-Latino rhetoric by implementing policies and
practices at the federal level.
Finally, Part IV discusses how Congress and the Obama Administration
can use immigration federalism in a meaningful way to advance the civil and
human rights of immigrants and citizens alike. I imagine what our nation
would look like if our immigration laws embodied a respect for human dignity
regardless of immigration status, and suggest that Congress should not merely
amend the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), but that the time is ripe for
a complete reinvention of American immigration law and policy. Drawing
from international law—specifically, the European Union concept of “freedom
of movement”—I offer suggestions to Congress and the Executive regarding
the moral and ethical dimensions that should be taken into consideration in the
exercise of their plenary power to regulate immigration, and posit that
comprehensive immigration reform in the Obama Administration should
reflect global, rather than local, concerns surrounding immigration and
migration in the twenty-first century.
I. NO ROOM AT THE INN: THE GROWING HOSTILITY TOWARD IMMIGRANTS IN
THE FIRST DECADE OF THE 21ST CENTURY
Congress’s recent attempts to enact comprehensive immigration reform at
the federal level have been dismal failures.1 Because immigration reform is a
controversial issue on both sides of the aisle, the House and the Senate were
unable to craft successful legislation reforming our federal immigration laws,
even with the support of the Bush Administration.2 The failure of the political
branches to gain enough votes to pass comprehensive immigration reform has
resulted in states and localities, in an attempt to push the envelope of the states’
historic police powers, to pass their own regulations of immigration in their
respective jurisdictions.3 Consequently, there has been a proliferation of
conflicting, and often hostile, laws directed at regulating the lives of
immigrants in the most mundane aspects of their everyday lives. From local
laws prohibiting the rental of property to immigrants on the grounds that doing
so is “harboring” aliens,4 to state sanctions against employers who are found to
1. Congress’s most recent attempt to pass comprehensive immigration reform failed to gain
approval by the Senate in the summer of 2007. See, e.g., Carolyn Lochhead, Immigrant Bill
Killed in Divided Senate, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., June 8, 2007, at A1, available at
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2007/06/08/MNGSVQBV4D1.DTL&hw=immi
gration+reform&sn=011&sc=247.
2. Id.
3. See National Immigration Forum, Immigration Law Enforcement by State and Local
Police, BACKGROUNDER (2007), http://www.immigrationforum.org/images/uploads/Back
grounder-StateLocalEnforcement.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2010).
4. Several cities, such as Escondido, California, attempted to prevent undocumented
persons from renting property in their municipalities by drafting laws that would make doing so a
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have undocumented immigrants in their employ,5 states and localities have
taken up the mantle of immigration reform in a way that, I argue, was never
envisioned by the Framers of the Constitution.
A.

State and Local Anti-Immigrant Ordinances, Statutes, and Ballot
Initiatives
1. Omnibus State and Local Anti-Immigrant Laws

Courts have long recognized that states may have an interest in regulation
of immigration within their jurisdictions, so long as their attempts to do so do
not conflict with or frustrate the will of Congress.6 Additionally, it is wellestablished that some aspects of the regulation of immigrants—for example,
employment of undocumented immigrants—falls within the historic police
powers of the states.7 Thus, while the surge in state and local anti-immigrant
ordinances in 2006 and 2007 may have seemed to come out of nowhere, these
laws are in fact only the most recent attempt by state and local governments to
regulate immigration in a long history of state-federal conflict regarding the
constitutional limits of immigration federalism.
Prior to the recent targeting of undocumented immigrants by state and
local governments, the last time a serious challenge to immigration federalism
was launched by the states occurred in the 1990s, when California attempted to
pass a comprehensive state law regulating immigration within its borders,
Proposition 187.8 However, while Proposition 187 and other late-20th century
state and local anti-immigrant laws tended to focus on the denial of public

“harboring” offense similar to the federal criminal harboring statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (2006). For
a further discussion of Escondido, see infra Part I.A.2.a.
5. See infra Part I.A.2.b.
6. See generally Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration
Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567 (2008) (arguing that local government can and should play an
important role in the regulation of immigration).
7. See De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 355 (1976). Although the holding in De Canas that
California’s state regulation of the employment of undocumented immigrants has long been
believed to have been superseded by Congress’s passage of the Immigration Reform and Control
Act (IRCA) in 1986, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently held, relying on De Canas, that
Arizona may constitutionally regulate the employment of undocumented immigrants through its
employer sanctions law, as doing so falls within the states’ historic police power. See Chicanos
Por La Causa v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d. 856, 864–865 (9th Cir. 2009). For a further discussion of
the potential implications of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Chicanos Por La Causa, see infra
Part III.B
8. See California’s Proposition 187, a ballot initiative that was approved by voters 59–41%
in 1994. Proposition 187 was ultimately invalidated by a federal court on the grounds that it was
preempted by federal law. Proposition 187, 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop 187 (West); See League
of United Latin American Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 786 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
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benefits to undocumented immigrants,9 or to restrict access to entitlements
such as drivers licenses,10 the second generation of proposed anti-immigrant
laws differ in the respect that they not only attempted to accomplish broader
regulations of immigration by the states—they also attempted to bring
regulation of immigration on the sub-federal level into the homes and
workplaces of cities and towns across America.11
a. San Bernardino, California
Although ultimately unsuccessful, the San Bernardino Illegal Immigration
Relief Act Ordinance12 was the first local ordinance in this new wave of 21st
century state and local anti-immigrant laws to gain widespread notoriety. The
San Bernardino law, which was created by a group calling itself “Save San
Bernardino” and led by San Bernardino resident Joe Turner,13 took this name
from the group that backed California’s notorious Proposition 187 in 1994,
Save Our State.14 Unlike Proposition 187, however, the San Bernardino Illegal
Immigration Relief Act Ordinance sought to do much more than deny
undocumented immigrants the ability to receive public benefits—it sought to
exclude them completely from public life, through a series of draconian
provisions that would have made it virtually impossible for anyone without
legal status to live or work in San Bernardino.15
The San Bernardino Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance was an
omnibus local ordinance that would have prevented undocumented persons
from living or working in the City of San Bernardino, with civil and criminal
penalties for persons in violation of the ordinance.16 The ordinance also
included an “English-only” provision, which went beyond making English the
official language of San Bernardino and attempted to penalize persons for
speaking languages other than English.17 While San Bernardino’s anti-

9. See, e.g., Proposition 187, 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop 187 (West).
10. Proof of lawful presence in the United States is required in almost every state in order to
receive a state-issued driver license or identity card under the REAL ID Act of 2005. See REAL
ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (2005).
11. See Rodríguez, supra note 6, at 591.
12. San Bernardino, Cal., Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance §§ 4–8 (2006)
[hereinafter San Bernardino Ordinance], available at http://www.ailadownloads.org/advo/San
BernardinoIllegalImmigrationOrdinance.pdf.
13. See Save San Bernardino!, Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance, http://www.cam
paignsitebuilder.com/templates/displayfiles/tmpl68.asp?SiteID=843&PageID=12139&Trial=false
(last visited Feb. 7, 2010).
14. See Southern Poverty Law Center, Intelligence Report, The Nativists, Winter 2005,
http://www.splcenter.org/intel/intelreport/article.jsp?pid=1266 (last visited Feb. 7, 2010).
15. See San Bernardino Ordinance, supra note 12.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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immigrant ordinance was ultimately narrowly rejected by the city council,18
and an attempt to get the law approved as a ballot initiative for consideration
by voters failed,19 anti-immigrant laws similar to the proposed ordinance in
San Bernardino soon began to surface all over the country with alarming
regularity. These state and local attempts to regulate immigration, and the
consequences that flowed from the involvement of local law enforcement in
federal immigration policy, spawned a great deal of controversy both inside
and outside the courtroom over the next several years.20
b. Hazleton, Pennsylvania
Following the defeat of the San Bernardino proposal, the most high-profile
local omnibus anti-immigrant ordinance to come in its wake was the Hazleton
Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance,21 which was approved by the
Hazleton City Council on July 13, 2006.22 The Hazleton Ordinance, which
was drafted by Hazleton Mayor Lou Barletta, was inspired by the failed
ordinance in San Bernardino23 and attempted—among other restrictions—to
prohibit the provision of housing to and employment of undocumented
immigrants within the City of Hazleton.24 It also contained a “tenant
registration” provision, which required all persons wishing to rent property in
Hazleton to obtain an occupancy license,25 an English-only provision,26 and
civil penalties for violation of the ordinance.27

18. On May 15, 2006, the San Bernardino City Council rejected the anti-immigrant
ordinance by a vote of 4-3. See James Sterngold, San Bernardino Seeking ‘Relief’; Struggling
City’s Proposal Targets Illegal Immigrants, S.F. CHRON., June 11, 2006, at A-4, available at
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2006/06/11/MNGM5JCE0B1.DTL&type=po
litics.
19. Superior Court Judge A. Rex Victor determined that not enough signatures had been
gathered for the proposal to qualify as a ballot initiative. See Kelly Rayburn, Judge Rejects
Initiative: Too Few Signatures Gathered for Immigration Measure, SAN BERNARDINO SUN, June
27, 2006, at B1, available at http://www.sbsun.com/search/ci_3983529.
20. See Rigel C. Oliveri, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Landlords, Latinos, Anti-Illegal
Immigrant Ordinances, and Housing Discrimination, 62 VAND. L. REV. 55, 60 (2009).
21. See HAZLETON, PA., ORDINANCE 2006-18 (Sept. 21, 2006), available at
http://www.smalltowndefenders.com/node/6. The Hazleton Ordinance was amended several
times as a result of litigation challenging the ordinance’s constitutionality, which is discussed in
further detail infra, Part I.B.
22. Id.
23. See Steve Mocarsky, Hazleton’s Illegal-Immigration Law a Trendsetter, THE TIMESLEADER (Wilkes-Barre, Pa.), July 31, 2006, at A1, available at 2006 WLNR 13173977.
24. ORDINANCE 2006-18.
25. HAZLETON, PA., ORDINANCE 2006-13 (Aug. 15, 2006), http://www.smalltowndefenders.
com/090806/2006-13%20_Landlord%20Tenant%20Ordinance.pdf.
26. HAZLETON, PA., ORDINANCE 2006-19 (Sept. 21, 2006), http://www.smalltowndefenders.
com/090806/2006-19%20_Official%20English.pdf.
27. ORDINANCE 2006-18.
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Although the Hazleton ordinance was also eventually struck down as
preempted under federal law,28 dozens of states and localities were quick to
pick up where Hazleton left off in its attempts to pass comprehensive
immigration regulations at the state and local level.29 Indeed, another local
omnibus immigration ordinance—enacted in Valley Park, Missouri30—has
survived several legal challenges to its constitutionality in both state and
federal court,31 with devastating impacts on the local immigrant and Latino
communities.32
Although cities and towns enacted some of the most dramatic sub-federal
immigration regulations, they were not the only jurisdictions that recently
attempted to enact omnibus anti-immigrant laws in excess of their
constitutional power. Among the states that have passed comprehensive
statutes regulating immigration within their jurisdictions since 2006 are South
Carolina,33 Oklahoma,34 and Missouri.35 Though most of these laws have been
challenged on the grounds that they are preempted by federal law, the litigation
results have been mixed.36 As such, there is currently far from a uniform
mandate from either Congress, the Executive, or the federal courts regarding
the permissibility of such state attempts to regulate immigration and when—or

28. See Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 521 (M.D. Pa. 2007). The District
Court’s decision was appealed to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals by the defendants. At the
time of this writing, the case remained under consideration by the three-judge panel.
29. See Oliveri, supra note 20, at 60–61.
30. See VALLEY PARK, MO., ORDINANCE 1708 (July 17, 2006), http://www.valleyparkmo.
org/docs/Ordinances/Ordinance%201708.pdf.
31. See infra Part I.B.
32. There is a great deal of anecdotal evidence that following the passage of state and local
anti-immigrant ordinances, Latino residents—both citizens and immigrants—were subject to
harassment and discrimination on the basis of their perceived immigration status. See, e.g.,
Valley Park Ordinance Under Fire, KOMU.COM, Nov. 8, 2006, http://www.komu.com/satellite/
SatelliteRender/KOMU.com/ba8a4513-c0a8-2f11-0063-9bd94c70b769/c98ea7cd-c0a8-2f110049-ecddeb0673b1 (discussing racial profiling in the wake of the Valley Park ordinance). There
is also evidence that because of this racial and ethnic hostility, Latinos began to voluntarily leave
these jurisdictions—what anti-immigrant activists refer to as “self-deportation.” See, e.g., Illegal
Immigrants Fleeing Apartments in Arizona, IMMIGR. CHRON., Jan. 31, 2008, http://blogs.chron.
com/immigration/archives/2008/01 (discussing the “self-deportation” of immigrants in Arizona
following the rash of laws targeting immigrants statewide).
33. South Carolina Illegal Immigration Reform Act, S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-31-40 (2008),
available at http://www.scstatehouse.gov/sess117_2007-2008/bills/392.htm.
34. See Oklahoma Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act, OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 446 (2007),
available at http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=448995.
35. See Missouri Omnibus Immigration Act, S.B. 348, 626 & 461, 94th Gen. Assem., 1st
Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2007), available at http://www.senate.mo.gov/07info/BTS_Web/Bill.aspx?
SessionType=r&BillID=6818.
36. See infra Part I.B.
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if—such statutes do not run afoul of Congress’s plenary power to regulate
immigration.37
2. State and Local Laws Regulating Housing and Employment of
Immigrants
Less comprehensive in scope than the omnibus attempts to regulate
immigration -though no less damaging to the immigrant community on a
practical level—are the state and local attempts to regulate either the housing
or employment of undocumented immigrants, or both. Although some states,
such as Tennessee,38 attempted to enact more narrow immigration
legislation—and several states passed laws mandating the use of E-Verify, the
federal electronic employment verification program39—most of the laws
regulating the housing or employment of immigrants have been passed at the
local level.40
a. Local Ordinances Regulating the Provision of Housing to
Undocumented Immigrants
In 2006, the war being waged on undocumented immigrants hit home—
literally. Late that year, the city councils in Escondido, California and Farmers
Branch, Texas, engaged in high-profile attempts to prevent undocumented
immigrants from being able to rent property from private landlords in their
cities.41 Both of these ordinances would test the limits of a local government’s
power to dictate whether and when individuals may rent privately owned
property to undocumented immigrants, and if restrictions on such activities
may be regulated consistent with the Immigration and Nationality Act’s (INA)
harboring provision42 and HUD regulations governing the federally subsidized
Section 8 housing program.43
37. See Oliveri, supra note 20, at 60.
38. The Tennessee Legislature passed a law imposing sanctions on employers who are found
to have employed undocumented immigrants. See TENN. CODE ANN. 50-1-103 (2007) (effective
Jan. 1, 2008), available at http://www.michie.com/tennessee/lpExt.dll?f=templates&eMail=Y&
fn=main-h.htm&cp=tncode/1d1ba/1d1c4/1d1cb/1d1dc.
39. State laws mandating that all employers participate in E-Verify have been passed by
Arizona, Mississippi, and South Carolina. Other states—including Colorado, Georgia, Idaho,
Minnesota, Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and Utah—have passed legislation requiring the
use of E-Verify for government contractors and other public entities. As of this writing,
mandatory E-Verify legislation is pending in Arkansas, Indiana, Kansas, Nebraska, Ohio, and
Rhode Island.
See NumbersUSA, Map of States with Mandatory E-Verify Laws,
http://www.numbersusa.com/content/learn/enforcement/workplace-verification/map-states-withmandatory-e-verify-laws.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2010) [hereinafter NumbersUSA].
40. See Oliveri, supra note 20, at 60.
41. Id.
42. 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (2006).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 1436a (2000) (restriction on use of assisted housing by non-resident aliens).
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On October 18, 2006, the Republican-majority Escondido City Council
passed an ordinance that would prevent the “harboring of illegal aliens in the
City of Escondido”44 by a vote of 3-2.45 The ordinance, which was enjoined
before it could take effect,46 would have made it unlawful to “let, lease or rent
a dwelling to an illegal alien” in the City of Escondido.47 The ordinance would
have also required the city’s Business License Division to verify the lawful
presence of all tenants in the City of Escondido through the federal Systematic
Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) database,48 and provided for fines,
suspension, and revocation of business licenses of landlords who were not in
compliance with the law.49
By contrast, the ordinance at issue in Farmers Branch required landlords in
the City of Farmers Branch to verify the lawful immigration status of their
individual tenants and to keep records demonstrating that none of their tenants
were unauthorized aliens.50 The Farmers Branch ordinance also attempted to
require private landlords to adhere to the requirements set forth by the United
States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) that persons
who participate in the federally subsidized housing program known as Section
8 prove their lawful presence in the United States.51 The Farmers Branch
ordinance also attempted to impose criminal sanctions of $500 per day for each
violation of the rental housing ordinance.52
b. State Employer Sanctions Laws
State employer sanctions laws are, generally, broader than state laws
mandating the use of E-Verify, and are therefore not found in as great a

44. See ESCONDIDO, CA., ORDINANCE 2006-38 R, http://www.cooley.com/files/tbl_s5Site
Repository/FileUpload21/925/Escondido%20Ordinance.pdf.
45. See David Fried, Escondido Council Approves Illegal Immigrant Rental Ban, N.
COUNTY TIMES (San Diego, Ca.), Oct. 5, 2006, available at http://www.nctimes.com/news/local/
article_6e9c96a5-3fed-56bf-ad60-17a22f9954d7.html.
46. See infra Part I.B.
47. ORDINANCE 2006-38 R.
48. The SAVE program was created pursuant to the Immigration Reform and Control Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359; the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1611 & 1621; the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009; and the REAL ID
Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231. See U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Servs., SAVE
Governing Laws, http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a75
43f6d1a/?vgnextoid=d013c2ec0c7c8110VgnVCM1000004718190aRCRD&vgnextchannel=d013
c2ec0c7c8110VgnVCM1000004718190aRCRD (last visited Feb. 7, 2010).
49. ORDINANCE 2006-38 R.
50. CITY OF FARMERS BRANCH, TX., ORDINANCE 2892 § 2 (2006), http://lawprofessors.type
pad.com/immigration/files/city_of_farmers_branch_ordinance_no_2892_2.pdf.
51. Id.
52. Id. § 4.
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number as the mandatory E-Verify laws.53 Although only a handful of states
have passed or attempted to pass state laws providing for sanctions against
employers who are found to “knowingly” employ persons who do not have
work authorization,54 the states that have done so have generally used the
threat of sanctions to encourage employers to use E-Verify rather than mandate
its use.55
However, the most notorious state employer sanctions law—the Legal
Arizona Workers Act (LAWA)56—mandates that all employers use E-Verify
and provides for sanctions for employers who “intentionally” employ persons
that are not legally authorized to work in the United States.57 Although the
LAWA does contain a “safe harbor” provision for employers who use E-Verify
to confirm that their employees are work authorized,58 yet nonetheless discover
that their employees are may not legally work in the United States, the
practical effect of the LAWA is that an employer may run afoul of the law by
not registering for E-Verify, for “intentionally” employing a person without
work authorization, or both.59
3. State Anti-Immigrant Ballot Initiatives
As discussed previously, the first highly-publicized anti-immigrant law
was Proposition 187, a 1994 California ballot initiative that restricted
undocumented immigrants’ access to health care, public education, and a
variety of other social services.60 Like California, the State of Arizona has
used the ballot initiative process to amend its state constitution to put several
anti-immigrant laws on the books in the past several years.61 While far from

53. See NumbersUSA, supra note 39.
54. See Kevin R. Lashus et al., Fear the ICE Man: Lessons from the Swift Raids to Warm
You Up—The New Government Perspective on Employer Sanctions, 32 NOVA. L. REV. 391, 402–
03 (2008).
55. Id.
56. Legal Arizona Workers Act, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-211 (1995).
57. Id. §§ 23-212, 23-212.01.
58. Id.
59. Mandatory participation by all Arizona employers in the E-Verify program express
provisions of the LAWA. While there are not separate sanctions for not enrolling in the E-Verify
program, the LAWA mimics the federal employer-sanctions provisions in the respect that
participation in E-Verify provides employers with a “safe harbor” provision should they
ultimately be found to have undocumented immigrants in their employ. See id. §§ 23-214 and
41-4401.
60. See supra notes 8 and 9 and accompanying text.
61. See generally Kevin R. Johnson, A Handicapped, Not “Sleeping,” Giant: The
Devastating Impact of the Initiative Process on Latina/o and Immigrant Communities, 96 CAL. L.
REV. 1259 (2008) (discussing how ballot initiatives, particularly in California, have targeted
Latinos and immigrants in recent years and the consequences that have followed).
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the only state to use the ballot initiative process for this purpose,62 Arizona’s
frequent use of the ballot initiative process to legislate against immigrants
exemplifies the “tyranny of the majority” mentality that often prevails in the
case of state and local anti-immigrant laws.
a. Arizona Proposition 200
The first state anti-immigrant ballot initiative to pass in Arizona was
Proposition 200, which was approved by 56% of the voters on November 2,
2004.63 This ballot initiative was similar in substance to California’s
Proposition 187, as its purpose is to prohibit undocumented persons from
voting and from receiving access to “state and local” public benefits in the
state of Arizona.64 Proposition 200—which was also known as the Arizona

62. Id. at 1271–73.
63. See National Immigration Forum, 2004 Election Analysis: Arizona’s Proposition 200
(2004), http://www.immigrationforum.org/images/uploads/AZProp200Analysis.pdf (last visited
Feb. 7, 2010).
64. See ARIZ. SEC’Y OF STATE, PROPOSITION 200, ARIZONA 2004 BALLOT INITIATIVES
(Sept. 2004), http://www.azsos.gov/election/2004/info/PubPamphlet/english/prop200.htm (last
visited Feb. 7, 2010) [hereinafter PROPOSITION 200]. The analysis by legislative council stated:
Proposition 200 would require that evidence of United States citizenship be
presented by every person to register to vote, that proof of identification be presented by
every voter at the polling place prior to voting, that state and local governments verify the
identity of all applicants for certain public benefits and that government employees report
United States immigration law violations by applicants for public benefits.
Proposition 200 provides that for purposes of registering to vote, satisfactory
evidence of United States citizenship includes: - an Arizona driver or nonoperating
identification license issued after October 1, 1996. - a driver or nonoperating
identification license issued by another state if the license indicates that the person has
provided proof of United States citizenship. - a copy of the applicant’s birth certificate. a United States passport, or a copy of the pertinent pages of the passport. - United States
naturalization documents or a verified certificate of naturalization number. - a Bureau of
Indian Affairs card number, tribal treaty card number or tribal enrollment number. - other
documents or methods of proof that may be established by the federal government for the
purpose of verifying employment eligibility.
The county recorder shall indicate this information in the person’s permanent voter
file for at least two years. A voter registration card from another county or state does not
constitute satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship. A person who is registered
to vote on the date that Proposition 200 becomes effective is not required to submit
evidence of citizenship unless the person moves to a different county. Once a person has
submitted sufficient evidence of citizenship, the person is not required to resubmit the
evidence when making changes to voter registration information in the county where the
evidence has been submitted.
Proposition 200 requires that prior to receiving a ballot at a polling place, a voter
must present either one form of identification that contains the name, address and
photograph of the person or two different forms of identification that contain the name
and address of the person.
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Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act65—was ultimately enacted as Arizona
Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 46-140.01. The law subsequently survived a
challenge to its constitutionality by community and civil rights groups in the
United States District Court for the District of Arizona,66 and the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals later dismissed the plaintiffs appeal for want of jurisdiction.67
The Arizona Attorney General, Terry Goddard, also issued an advisory opinion
regarding the constitutionality of Proposition 200, concluding that the portions
of the law prohibiting the receipt of “state and local public benefits” by
undocumented persons were likely constitutional, so long as implementation of
the state statute was limited to conform with the federal restrictions on public
benefits for undocumented persons.68
Another key element of Proposition 200 was the voter identification and
citizenship verification provisions, which required all persons to prove their
United States citizenship at the time they registered to vote and to display

Proposition 200 requires that a state or local governmental entity that is responsible
for administering “state and local public benefits that are not federally mandated” must: verify the identity and eligibility for each applicant for the public benefits. - provide other
state and local government employees with information to verify immigration status of
applicants applying for public benefits and must also assist other state and local
government employees in obtaining immigration status information from federal
immigration authorities. - refuse to accept any state or local government identification
card, including a driver license, to establish identity or eligibility for public benefits
unless the governmental entity that issued the card has verified the immigration status of
the applicant. - require all state and local government employees to make a written report
to federal immigration authorities upon discovering a violation of federal immigration
laws by an applicant for public benefits. An employee or supervisor who fails to make
the required report is guilty of a class 2 misdemeanor, potentially punishable by a jail
sentence of up to 4 months and a fine of up to $750, plus applicable surcharges.
Any resident of this state would have standing to bring a court action against the
state, a local governmental entity or an agent of a state or local governmental entity to
remedy a violation of the public benefits verification law including bringing an action to
compel a government official to comply with the law.
Proposition 200 does not define the term “state and local public benefits that are not
federally mandated.”
Id.
65. The group that was the drafter and major proponent of Proposition 200, Protect Arizona
Now, gathered signatures for the Proposition 200 ballot initiative under this name.
66. See Friendly House v. Napolitano, CV 04-649 TUC DCB (D. Ariz. Dec. 22, 2004).
67. See Friendly House v. Napolitano, 419 F.3d 930, 932 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that the
record revealed no case or controversy between the plaintiffs and the State of Arizona).
68. Following an analysis of the statutory language of Proposition 200 and the federal law
restricting public benefits to undocumented aliens, Arizona Attorney General Goddard stated that
“[The programs] subject to Proposition 200 are those within Title 46 that are subject to eligibility
restrictions in 8 U.S.C. § 1621.” Op. Att’y Gen. No. I04-010 (R04-036) (Nov. 12, 2004),
http://www.azag.gov/opinions/2004/I04-010.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2010).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1472231

CAMPBELL_ARTICLE.DOCX

2010] IMAGINING A MORE HUMANE IMMIGRATION POLICY IN THE AGE OF OBAMA

427

state-issued identification upon voting.69 Like the public benefits portions of
the law, the voter identification requirements of Proposition 200 were
unsuccessfully challenged in federal court, and remain requirements for voting
in Arizona to this day.70
b. Arizona Proposition 100
The fall of 2006 gave rise to a trio of anti-immigrant ballot initiatives in
the State of Arizona—Propositions 100, 102, and 300.71 Arguably the most
damaging of these ballot initiatives is Proposition 100, which amended the
Arizona Constitution to provide that undocumented persons charged with
enumerated felonies are ineligible for bail.72 Although the language of the
ballot initiative was ultimately amended because of vagueness concerns,73

69. See PROPOSITION 200, supra note 64.
70. See Gonzalez v. Arizona, 485 F.3d 1041, 1043–44 (9th Cir. 2007).
71. See ARIZ. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, 2006 BALLOT PROPOSITIONS ANALYSES,
http://www.azleg.state.az.us/2006_Ballot_Proposition_Analyses (providing links to Propositions
100, 102, and 300) (last visited Aug. 13, 2010).
72. See ARIZ. SEC’Y OF STATE, 2006 BALLOT PROPOSITIONS AND JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE
REVIEW–PROPOSITION 100, http://www.azsos.gov/election/2006/Info/pubpamphlet/english/Prop
100.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2010). The Proposition 100 ballot-initiative language that was
approved by voters read in part:
Be it resolved by the House of Representatives of the State of Arizona, the Senate
concurring:
Article II, section 22, Constitution of Arizona, is proposed to be amended as
follows if approved by the voters and on proclamation of the Governor:
22. Bailable offenses
Section 22. A. All persons charged with crime shall be bailable by sufficient
sureties, except for: . . .
4. FOR SERIOUS FELONY OFFENSES AS PRESCRIBED BY THE
LEGISLATURE IF THE PERSON CHARGED HAS ENTERED OR REMAINED IN
THE UNITED STATES ILLEGALLY AND IF THE PROOF IS EVIDENT OR THE
PRESUMPTION GREAT AS TO THE PRESENT CHARGE. . . .
The Secretary of State shall submit this proposition to the voters at the next general
election as provided by article XXI, Constitution of Arizona.
Id.
73. The Legislature defined serious felony offenses and further clarified this exception in
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3961 (2001) to read:
13-3961. Offenses not bailable; purpose; preconviction; exceptions
A. A person who is in custody shall not be admitted to bail if the proof is evident or
the presumption great that the person is guilty of the offense and the offense charged is
either:
1. A capital offense.
2. Sexual assault.
3. Sexual conduct with a minor who is under fifteen years of age.
4. Molestation of a child who is under fifteen years of age.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1472231

CAMPBELL_ARTICLE.DOCX

428

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXIX:415

Proposition 100 was eventually implemented as an amendment to Article II, §
22 of the Arizona Constitution74 and Arizona Revised Statute § 39-3961
(“A.R.S. § 39-3961).75
Although Proposition 100 amended the Arizona Constitution—and is
therefore applicable statewide—enforcement of the state law requiring
undocumented persons charged with a Class 4 felony or better be held nonbondable has disproportionately occurred in Maricopa County.76 Maricopa
County, which is home to more than half of the state population, includes
within its jurisdiction the state’s largest city and capital, Phoenix.77 Maricopa
County is also home to the notorious Sheriff Joe Arpaio—the self-proclaimed
“America’s Toughest Sheriff”78—and County Attorney Andrew Thomas, who
helped draft Proposition 100.79 The combined efforts of these two law
enforcement officers in Maricopa County has led to vigorous—and some
would say unconstitutional80—enforcement of Arizona’s state laws targeting
immigrants, with Proposition 100 emerging as, and remaining,81 an effective
tool in their arsenal.82

5. A serious felony offense if the person has entered or remained in the United
States illegally. For the purposes of this paragraph . . . (b) “serious felony offense”
means any class 1, 2, 3 or 4 felony or any violation of section 28-1383.
74. ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 22.
75. § 13-3961.
76. See Joanna Dodder Nellans, Day 4: Courts Work Through Prop. 100 Bail Issues, THE
DAILY COURIER (Prescott, Ariz.), Nov. 28, 2007, available at http://www.dcourier.com/
main.asp?SectionID=74&SubSectionID=516&ArticleID=50100&TM=15120.5.
77. See ARIZ. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, PROFILE: MARICOPA COUNTY, ARIZONA, Dec. 2009,
http://www.azcommerce.com/doclib/COMMUNE/Maricopa%20County.pdf.
78. SHERIFF JOE ARPAIO WITH LEN SHERMAN, AMERICA’S TOUGHEST SHERIFF: HOW WE
CAN WIN THE WAR AGAINST CRIME (1996) (Sheriff Joe Arpaio’s 1996 autobiography).
79. See Nellans, supra note 76.
80. The Arizona Court of Appeals has held that Proposition 100 is not unconstitutional. See
Segura v. Cunanan, 196 P.3d 831, 835–36 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008). But see Complaint for
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Lopez-Valenzuela v.
Maricopa County, No. 2:08-cv-00660 (D. Ariz. April 4, 2008), available at http://bibdaily.com/
pdfs/Lopez-Valenzuela%204-4-08.pdf (a separate challenge to the law’s constitutionality
currently pending before Judge Susan R. Bolton.) [hereinafter Lopez-Valenzuela Complaint];
Michael Kiefer, Groups Sue, Challenge Prop. 100, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Apr. 8, 2008, at B1,
available at http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/2008/04/08/20080408aclu0408.html.
81. Although the constitutional challenge to Proposition 100 that is currently pending in the
District of Arizona survived a motion to dismiss by the defendants was certified as a class in
December 2008, the plaintiffs did not seek preliminary injunctive relief prohibiting enforcement
of the law during the pendency of the litigation. See Lopez-Valenzuela Complaint, supra note 81.
Therefore, at the time of this writing, hundreds—if not thousands—of alleged noncitizens are
being held without bond pursuant to Proposition 100.
82. Andrew Thomas has touted Proposition 100 as one of his major accomplishments as
Maricopa County Attorney as part of his exploratory run for Governor of Arizona in 2010. See,
e.g., ANDREW THOMAS FOR ATTORNEY GEN. EXPLORATORY COMM., FIGHTING FOR CHANGE: A
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c. Arizona Proposition 102
One of the most puzzling anti-immigrant laws to be enacted through ballot
initiative in 2006 was Arizona’s Proposition 102, which provides that
undocumented persons may not receive an award of punitive damages as the
result of a civil suit brought in the state of Arizona.83 To date, the law has not
been challenged on constitutional grounds, though it has been raised as a
defense to a punitive damages claim in a civil rights lawsuit brought against a
southern Arizona rancher who violated the civil rights of individuals on his
property he believe to be undocumented immigrants.84 However, the fact that
such a seemingly unnecessary law was even conceived of—much less
approved with 74.2% of Arizonans voting “yes”85—exemplifies the antiimmigrant hysteria and the antipathy toward undocumented persons in the state
of Arizona in general.
d. Arizona Proposition 300
Because individuals without lawful status may not become residents of the
states in which they reside for purposes of receiving benefits—such as in-state
tuition at state colleges and universities—many states have passed laws that
allow undocumented students who meet certain qualifications to receive outof-state tuition waivers.86 With the passage of Proposition 300,87 however,
RECORD OF RESULTS, http://www.thomasforagexploratory.com/Record.aspx (last visited Feb. 7,
2010).
83. See ARIZ. SEC’Y OF STATE, 2006 BALLOT PROPOSITIONS AND JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE
REVIEW, PROPOSITION 102, Sept. 2006, http://www.azsos.gov/election/2006/Info/PubPamphlet/
english/Prop102.htm. The 2006 ballot initiative, in its entirety, read:
Be it resolved by the Senate of the State of Arizona, the House of Representatives
concurring:
1. Article II, Constitution of Arizona, is proposed to be amended by adding section
35 as follows if approved by the voters and on proclamation of the Governor:
35. Actions by illegal aliens prohibited
A PERSON WHO IS PRESENT IN THIS STATE IN VIOLATION OF
FEDERAL IMMIGRATION LAW RELATED TO IMPROPER ENTRY BY AN
ALIEN SHALL NOT BE AWARDED PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN ANY ACTION
IN ANY COURT IN THIS STATE.
2. The Secretary of State shall submit this proposition to the voters at the next
general election as provided by article XXI, Constitution of Arizona.
84. See Jerry Seper, 16 Illegals Sue Arizona Rancher, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2009, at A03,
available at 2009 WLNR 2542937.
85. See ARIZ. SEC’Y OF STATE, 2006 GENERAL ELECTION PROPOSITION 102,
http://www.azsos.gov/results/2006/general/BM102.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2010).
86. See Michael A. Olivas, Lawmakers Gone Wild? College Residency and the Response to
Professor Kobach, 61 SMU L. REV. 99, 106 (2008).
87. See ARIZ. SEC’Y OF STATE, 2006 BALLOT PROPOSITIONS AND JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE
REVIEW, PROPOSITION 300, Sept. 2006, http://www.azsos.gov/election/2006/info/PubPamphlet/
english/Prop300.htm.
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Arizona took the opposite approach, and made undocumented persons
categorically ineligible to pay in-state tuition at state colleges and
universities.88
Proposition 300 amended Arizona Revised Statutes §§ 15-191.01, 15-232,
15-1803, 46-801 and 46-803, and added § 15-1825.89 Like Proposition 200,
the amendments under Proposition 300 were styled as a denial of public
benefits to persons without lawful immigration status.90 Unlike other state
laws regarding in-state tuition for undocumented persons, however, the
Arizona statute takes it a step further and also prohibits undocumented persons
from participating in adult education classes, such as English as a Second
Language (ESL).91
Although there is little empirical data on the effects of Proposition 300 on
undocumented students in Arizona, there is anecdotal evidence suggesting that
while the law has allowed the state of Arizona to receive some additional
revenue by charging undocumented students out-of-state tuition, the law has
also had the effect of denying an education to bright young people because of
the prohibitive costs associated with obtaining higher education.92

88. Id.
89. Id. The amendments that comprised Proposition 300 were specifically referred to as
“relating to public program eligibility.” Id.
90. Id. The section S 15-1825 was added to the Arizona Revised Statutes as a result of the
passage of Proposition 300. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-1825 (2007) reads in its entirety:
§ 15-1825: Prohibited financial assistance; report
A. A person who is not a citizen of the united states, who is without lawful
immigration status and who is enrolled as a student at any university under the jurisdiction
of the Arizona board of regents or at any community college under the jurisdiction of a
community college district in this state is not entitled to tuition waivers, fee waivers,
grants, scholarship assistance, financial aid, tuition assistance or any other type of
financial assistance that is subsidized or paid in whole or in part with state monies.
B. Each community college and university shall report on December 31 and June 30
of each year to the joint legislative budget committee the total number of students who
applied and the total number of students who were not entitled to tuition waivers, fee
waivers, grants, scholarship assistance, financial aid, tuition assistance or any other type
of financial assistance that is subsidized or paid in whole or in part with state monies
under this section because the student was not a citizen or legal resident of the united
states or not lawfully present in the united states.
C. This section shall be enforced without regard to race, religion, gender, ethnicity
or national origin.
91. § 15-232(B), (C).
92. See Jonathan J. Cooper, Many Still Apply for Benefits in Spite of Proposition 300, ARIZ.
DAILY STAR, Aug. 10, 2009, at A13, available at http://azstarnet.com/news/state-and-regional/
article_f97febae-46cd-5ebc-8723-ba318dac8596.html.
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e. Arizona’s State Human Smuggling Law
Another statewide law targeting undocumented immigrants is the Arizona
State Human Smuggling Statute.93 Although the legislative history indicates
that the Arizona Legislature may have intended the state human smuggling law
to apply only to the coyotes (smugglers),94 the law has been interpreted by
Maricopa County Attorney Andrew Thomas to include in the statutory
definition of “conspiracy to commit human smuggling” the smugglees
themselves.95 This application of the conspiracy statute, while controversial,
has withstood legal challenges in Arizona state courts.96
Perhaps the most damaging aspect of the Arizona state human smuggling
statute is the fact that Maricopa County Sheriff Joe Arpaio has seized on the
statute as independent justification for his “crime suppression” sweeps,
separate and apart from his agreement with DHS pursuant to INA § 287(g).97
Based on this interpretation of the state human smuggling state, Sheriff Arpaio
contends that his deputies may continue to question individuals about their
immigration status, even though DHS recently revoked Maricopa County’s
task-force MOA under §287(g).98 As such, it appears that unless and until the
Arizona Legislature amends the state human smuggling law to specifically
prohibit charging smuggled persons with conspiracy to smuggle themselves—
an amendment which has already been attempted, and failed99—local law

93. § 13-2319.
94. See H.B. 2539, 47th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2007) (statement of Rep. Paton, Member,
House Comm. on the Judiciary, Feb. 10, 2005 minutes, at 3) (statements evidencing an intent on
the part of the legislature to criminalize only the actions of the coyotes—those who profit from
human smuggling—and not the persons who are smuggled).
95. A person is guilty of conspiracy to commit human smuggling under Arizona law if: 1)
“with the intent to promote or aid” human smuggling; 2) he agrees with one or more persons that
at least one of them or another person will; 3) intentionally transport or procure the transport of a
person who is not a United States citizen, permanent resident alien, or otherwise lawfully in
Arizona; 4) for profit or commercial purpose; 5) while knowing or having reason to know that the
person being transported is not a United States citizen, permanent resident alien, or otherwise
lawfully in Arizona; and 6) one of the parties commits an overt act in furtherance of the offense.
§§ 13-1003(A); 13-2319(A), (D)(2).
96. See, e.g., State v. Juan Barragan-Sierra, 196 P.3d 879 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008); see also
Amanda Lee Myers, AZ Court: Immigrants Subject to Smuggling Law, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, July 17,
2008, available at 7/17/08 APALERTAZ 23:06:33.
97. See, e.g., Caleb Groos, Arpaio Immigration Raids Continue: Under What Authority,
FINDLAW BLOTTER, Oct. 16, 2009, http://blogs.findlaw.com/blotter/2009/10/arpaio-immigrationraids-continue-under-what-authority.html.
98. See JJ Hensley, Sheriff Arpaio May Lose Some Immigrant Authority, ARIZ. REPUBLIC,
Oct. 3, 2009, at A1, available at http://www.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/news/articles/2009/
10/03/20091003arpaio-ice1003.html.
99. In 2007, the Arizona Legislature defeated in committee two bills that would have
eliminated the application of conspiracy and other preparatory offenses under the human
smuggling statute to the persons being smuggled. See H.B. 2270 and 2271, 48th Leg., 1st Reg.
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enforcement in Maricopa County will continue to use the statute not as a
vehicle for assisting trafficked persons, but as a mechanism for pretextual
traffic stops and racial profiling.
f.

Pending Anti-Immigrant Legislation and Ballot Initiatives

While the initial fervor by states and municipalities to pass local laws
regulating immigration has died down considerably over the past several
years,100 the threat is far from over. Russell Pearce, the Arizona state senator
who authored and sponsored the majority of the anti-immigrant laws that have
made their way through the Arizona legislature since 2006,101 continues to
draft and propose state laws that target undocumented persons and criminalize
their every day behavior.102 Currently, Senator Pearce has indicated his
intention to attempt for a third time to criminalize unlawful presence in
Arizona as a trespass—despite strong indications that such a law is
unconstitutional103—and to outlaw solicitation by day laborers statewide.104

Sess. (Ariz. 2007), http://www.azleg.gov/legtext/48leg/1r/bills/hb2270p.pdf and http://www.az
leg.gov/legtext/48leg/1r/bills/hb2271p.pdf.
100. At the peak of state and local government attempts to pass sub-federal immigration
regulations in 2007, state legislators in 50 states introduced 1,059 immigration-related bills and
resolutions, or which 167 were enacted into law. See LAUREEN LAGLAGARON ET AL.,
MIGRATION POLICY INST., REGULATING IMMIGRATION AT THE STATE LEVEL: HIGHLIGHTS
FROM THE DATABASE OF 2007 STATE IMMIGRATION LEGISLATION AND THE METHODOLOGY 3
(Oct. 2008), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/2007methodology.pdf.
101. See Day to Day: Arizona Voters Face Immigration Initiatives (NPR radio broadcast Oct.
31, 2006), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=6411513.
102. For example, Senator Pearce has repeatedly sponsored a bill that would make unlawful
presence in the State of Arizona a criminal trespass under state law. See Press Release, Ariz.
State Senate, Senate Committee Passes Illegal Immigration Bill that Requires Interagency
Enforcement, Makes Trespassing by Illegal Immigrants a Crime (June 11, 2009),
http://www.russellpearce.com/archives/newsletters/1175.htm. Such bills have passed the Arizona
legislature twice, and were twice vetoed by former Arizona Governor Janet Napolitano. See
Jacques Billeaud, Arizona House Rejects Immigration Enforcement Bill, ARIZ. DAILY STAR, July
1, 2009, available at 7/1/09 APALERTAZ 12:49:54.
103. In 2005, New Hampshire attempted to pass a law that would have made illegal presence
in the state a criminal trespass. The law was challenged on constitutional grounds and enjoined
by a state court before it could take effect. See New Hampshire v. Barros-Batistele et. al., No. 05CR-1474, 1475, slip op. (Nashua D. Ct. 2005), available at http://www.courts.state.nh.us/district/
orders/criminal_trespass_decision.pdf.
104. See JENNIFER ALLEN, BORDER ACTION NETWORK, ARIZONA LEGISLATURE AGAIN
SEEKS TO CRIMINALIZE DAY LABORERS, HB2355 PASSES THE HOUSE COW (May 21, 2009),
http://www.borderaction.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=138%3Aari
zona-legislature-again-seeks-to-criminalize-day-laborers-hb2355-passes-the-house-cow&catid=
43%3Aarizona-legislature&Itemid=143&lang=en. SB 1070, which was signed into law in April
2010, includes a section prohibiting the solicitation of employment by undocumented persons
statewide. See SB 1070, Section 5, which amends Title 13, chapter 29, Arizona Revised Statutes
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Senator Pearce has also indicated that if these proposals fail in the legislature,
or are vetoed by Governor Jan Brewer, he will seek to get them approved as
ballot initiatives in November 2010.105
Another anti-immigrant ballot initiative that poses a serious threat in the
2010 election is currently gathering signatures in California. The California
Taxpayer Protection Act of 2010,106 like Proposition 187 before it, seeks to
make undocumented persons ineligible for public benefits in the state of
California.107 However, the California Taxpayer Protection Act contains a new
and frightening attempt to limit the rights of undocumented persons by
targeting their United States citizen children, referring to the births of such
children as “birth tourism.”108 Drafted by an anti-immigrant organization in
San Diego, Taxpayer Revolution,109 the Taxpayer Protection Act attempts to
reinterpret the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution by
stating that children born to undocumented persons are not birthright citizens
because their parents are not “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United
States.110 If passed, the law would not permit children born in the United
States to undocumented parents to receive birth certificates, but would instead
require California to issue certificates noting a birth to a “foreign parent.”111
The law would also require the mother of the child to be fingerprinted,
photographed, and have her personal information transmitted to the
Department of Homeland Security,112 presumably in order to assist with
federal immigration enforcement.
Although it seems radical, this interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment
has been floated by immigration restrictionists before,113 and this is not the first

by adding sections 13-2928 and 13-2929, http://www.azleg.gov/legtext/49leg/2r/bills/sb10
70s.pdf.
105. See Matthew Benson, Immigration Foes Pledge New Bill, Voter Initiative, ARIZ.
REPUBLIC, Oct. 22, 2009, at B1, available at 2009 WLNR 20939214.
106. The full text of the proposed ballot initiative is available at http://www.taxpayer
revolution.org, the website of the group Taxpayer Revolution, which drafted the proposal and is
gathering signatures in support of the initiative. See CALIFORNIA TAXPAYER PROTECTION ACT,
TAXPAYER REVOLUTION, http://www.taxpayerrevolution.org (last visited Feb. 9, 2010)
[hereinafter TAXPAYER REVOLUTION].
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See AN INITIATIVE TO HELP CALIFORNIA’S BUDGET DEFICIT CRISIS: CALIFORNIA
TAXPAYER PROTECTION ACT BORDER CONTROL BY STOPPING THE MAGNETS, TAXPAYER
REVOLUTION, http://www.taxpayerrevolution.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&
id=2&Itemid=2 (last visited Feb. 9, 2010).
112. Id.
113. Prominent immigration restriction groups, such as the Federation for American
Immigration Reform (FAIR), have long contended that the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
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time such a provision has been considered for approval by voters as part of a
ballot initiative.114 Should the Taxpayer Protection Act gain approval by
California voters, and amend the California Constitution to redefine birthright
citizenship in the manner proposed by the initiative, there will almost certainly
be a constitutional challenge to the law—which, it appears, is exactly what the
supporters of the law are hoping for.115 As of November 2009, the
organization indicated that a new petition would be available on its website for
signature gathering in January 2010.116
B.

Litigation Responses to State and Local Anti-Immigrant Laws

Predictably, there has been a proliferation of litigation in both state and
federal court challenging the constitutionality of the sub-federal immigration
restrictions.117 Perhaps also predictably, the success of this litigation has been
mixed.118 The main legal theory used to challenge these laws—federal
preemption—has been generally successful in the housing context, but the
challenges to state and local regulations of employment of aliens have been
less successful.119 The Hazleton and Arizona cases, which are the two major

States Constitution does not confer birthright citizenship on the children of parents who are not
lawfully present in the United States at the time of the child’s birth. See, e.g., A FAIR Review . . .
The 14th Amendment Debate, IMMIGRATION REPORT (Fed’n for Am. Immigr. Reform,
Washington, D.C.), Apr. 2005, http://www.fairus.org/site/PageServer?pagename=research_
research65c8. See also EDWARD ERLER, THE HERITAGE FOUND., BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENSHIP AND
THE CONSTITUTION (Dec. 1, 2005), http://www.heritage.org/Research/GovernmentReform/
wm925.cfm.
114. Perhaps unsurprisingly, a similar ballot initiative was proposed in Arizona in 2007,
though it failed to gather enough signatures to be placed on the ballot in the 2008 election. See
Measures Target Citizenship for Migrants’ Kids, TUCSON CITIZEN, Dec. 3, 2007,
http://www.tucsoncitizen.com/daily/local/70521.php.
115. See The Pat Morrison Show: New Ballot Initiative Takes Aim at Illegal Immigrants
(KPCC Southern California Public Radio broadcast July 13, 2009), available at
http://www.scpr.org/programs/patt-morrison/2009/07/13/new-ballot-initiative-takes-aim-at-il
legal-immigra.
116. See TAXPAYER REVOLUTION, supra note 106.
117. See generally STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT, THE AM IMMIGR. LAW FOUND.
http://www.ailf.org/lac/clearinghouse_120706.shtml (last visited Feb. 9, 2010).
118. Id.
119. There is currently a split of authority in both the federal district courts and circuit courts
of appeal on the issue of whether such laws are preempted under federal law. The Escondido and
Farmers Branch ordinances, which were both local immigration housing ordinances, were
enjoined by federal courts on the grounds that they are preempted by federal immigration law.
See supra Part I. However, in the employment context, there are split decisions out of the Middle
District of Pennsylvania and the District of Arizona regarding whether the revocation of state
business licenses as a penalty for employing undocumented workers is preempted as a “licensing
or similar law” within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(h)(2). See Chicanos Por La Causa v.
Napolitano, 558 F.3d. 856, 860–61 (9th Cir. 2009); see infra Part III.
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decisions interpreting whether states may regulate the employment of
undocumented persons by imposing sanctions on businesses—such as the
revocation of state business licenses—have offered contradictory views on
Congress’s intent regarding the scope of states’ authority in this area.120
Therefore, unless Congress sees fit to clarify its meaning regarding when and
how states may regulate immigration through “licensing or similar laws,”121—
or the United States Supreme Court resolves the split of authority interpreting
this provision122—the ongoing litigation challenging the constitutionality of
these state and local immigration regulations seems unlikely to put a rest to
these issues any time soon.123
II. THE RISE OF ENFORCEMENT-ONLY IMMIGRATION POLICIES: §287(G),
RACIAL PROFILING, ICE RAIDS, AND THE INCREASE OF HATE CRIMES AGAINST
IMMIGRANTS AND LATINOS
At the heart of my argument that Congress and the Executive have failed to
meaningfully assert their plenary power to regulate immigration is the
delegation of federal immigration enforcement powers by Congress to state
law enforcement agencies through the enactment of INA § 287(g).124 I argue

120. See Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 459 F. Supp. 2d. 332, 338 (M.D. Pa. 2006) (holding that
local employer sanctions ordinance could be unlawful); Arizona Contractors Ass’n, Inc. v.
Candelaria, 534 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1046 (D. Ariz. 2008) (holding that state employer sanctions
law falls within the savings clause of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(h)(2) and is therefore not expressly
preempted).
121. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2006).
122. The plaintiffs in Chicanos Por La Causa filed a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to
review the decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals with the United States Supreme Court
in July 2009. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America et. al. v. Candelaria, No.
09-115 (U.S. July 24, 2009), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/
2009/10/09-115_pet.pdf. On November 2, 2009, the Court asked the Solicitor General to provide
a brief expressing the views of the United States on this issue. See Josh Gerstein, Supreme Court
Query Puts Janet Napolitano on the Spot, POLITICO, Nov. 6, 2009, http://www.politico.com/
news/stories/1109/29222.html.
123. In addition to the cases on review by the Third and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals,
challenges to local immigration regulations have also been considered by the Eighth and Tenth
Circuit Courts of Appeals, and the issue is likely to eventually reach the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals, as well. See Gray v. City of Valley Park, 567 F.3d 976, 985–87 (8th Cir. 2009)
(upholding constitutionality of local anti-immigrant ordinance); Chamber of Commerce of the
United States v. Henry, No. CIV-08-109-C, 2008 WL 2329164, at *6–7 (W.D. Okla. June 4,
2008) (preliminarily enjoining statewide anti-immigrant law, H.B. 1804) (oral argument
appealing the district court’s decision in the 10th Circuit held June 2009); Villas at Parkside
Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 577 F. Supp. 2d 851, 856 (N.D. Tex. 2008) (permanently
enjoining anti-immigrant housing ordinance).
124. Although almost always referred to simply by its code section in the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA), the proper title of § 287(g) is “Acceptance of State Services to Carry Out
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that if the Obama Administration is serious about accomplishing
comprehensive immigration reform in the near future, the first thing President
Obama must do is immediately enact a moratorium on the 287(g) program and
recommend that Congress repeal the statute in its entirety. In support of that
argument, this section describes in some detail the history and substantive
provisions of the 287(g) program, and discusses the federal government’s
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)125 with Maricopa County, Arizona, to
demonstrate a few of the myriad problems that arise from this form of
delegation of immigration enforcement to sub-federal law enforcement
entities.126
A.

Delegation of Immigration Responsibilities to Local Law Enforcement
Pursuant to INA § 287(g)

Under INA 287(g), there are two models by which local law enforcement
officials may enforce federal immigration law.127 The first is the task-force
model, which allows for enforcement of civil immigration law in connection
with routine law enforcement activities (such as traffic stops).128 The second is
the jail model, in which Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officials
check the immigration status of persons who are booked into local jails in
connection with an arrest pursuant to a violation of state or local law.129
Although I will discuss each model separately, DHS has the authority to enter
into agreements with local law enforcement agencies pursuant to both of these
models, and they often do.130

Immigration Enforcement.” Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub.
L. No. 104-208, § 133, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-563 (1996) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1357).
125. Jurisdictions that enter into 287(g) agreements with the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) sign a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with DHS. Previously, these
agreements were referred to as Memorandums of Understanding (MOU), and though the name
has changed, the form and substance of these agreements remain largely the same. See
Memorandum of Agreement between United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement and
Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office (2009), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/memorandumsofAgree
mentUnderstanding/r_287gmaricopacountyso102609.pdf.
126. For a detailed examination of the particular concerns of the Maricopa County 287(g)
program, see AARTI SHAHANI & JUDITH GREENE, JUSTICE STRATEGIES, LOCAL DEMOCRACY ON
ICE: WHY STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS HAVE NO BUSINESS IN FEDERAL IMMIGRATION
LAW ENFORCEMENT (Feb. 2009), http://www.justicestrategies.org/2009/local-democracy-icewhy-state-and-local-governments-have-no-business-federal-immigration-law-en.
127. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 287(g), 8 U.S.C. 1357 (2006).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See, e.g., Memorandum of Agreement, supra note 126 (entering into an agreement with
the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office under both the task-force and jail models). In October
2009, DHS chose not to renew its task-force model agreement with the Maricopa County
Sheriff’s Office, opting instead to only authorize participation in the jail model in Maricopa
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1. The Task-Force Model
Under the 287(g) task-force model, local law enforcement officers are
cross-deputized as ICE officers and authorized to perform limited immigration
enforcement functions in connection with their routine enforcement of state
and local law.131 Local law enforcement officers that are cross-deputized
pursuant to the 287(g) program also receive extra training regarding
immigration law and its enforcement, and are subject to the same rules and
regulations as regular ICE officials, although they are primarily supervised by
the local law enforcement agency and not DHS.132
The task-force model has led to a great deal of variation in the enforcement
of immigration laws across jurisdictions that have entered into agreements with
DHS pursuant to § 287(g).133 Because of the lack of oversight by DHS, the
implementation of the provisions of the MOA has been left to local law
enforcement agencies and has resulted in allegations of improper questioning
of immigration status without reasonable suspicion or probable cause, and
racial profiling of Latinos and other individuals whom local law enforcement
believe may be “foreign.”134 As such, in jurisdictions that have agreements
with DHS pursuant to the task-force model, the practical effect has been the
impression—if not the fact135—that all local law enforcement officers are also
ICE agents, and the impact on public safety has been disastrous.136

County. See Brent Johnson, Sheriff Joe Stripped of Powers, IMMIGRATION LAW REFORM BLOG,
Oct. 6, 2009, http://immigrationlawreformblog.blogspot.com/2009/10/sherriff-joe-stripped-ofpowers.html.
131. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 287(g).
132. See SHAHANI & GREENE, supra note 126, at 4.
133. Id. at 13.
134. Id. at 3. Although Maricopa County is the most notorious example of a local law
enforcement agency enforcing immigration laws beyond the scope of their MOA with DHS, other
jurisdictions have been accused of improperly using their agency’s § 287(g) agreement in ways
that have led to allegations of racial profiling and improper detentions. See, e.g., Prayer Vigil
Community Opposition to 287(g) Program, TENN. IMMIGRANT AND REFUGEE RIGHTS COAL.,
Oct. 21, 2009, http://www.tnimmigrant.org/home/2009/10/21/prayer-vigil-voices-communityopposition-to-287g-program.html.
135. Under the MOAs with DHS, only local law enforcement officers who receive special
training in immigration enforcement may be cross-deputized to perform limited immigration
enforcement under § 287(g). However, in some jurisdictions, there is evidence that officers who
have not been formally trained and deputized are carrying out immigration enforcement functions
in reliance on their agency’s MOA under § 287(g). See SHAHANI & GREENE, supra note 126, at
15–16.
136. There is evidence that immigrants, including lawful immigrants and crime victims, are
more reluctant to cooperate with local law enforcement agencies with § 287(g) agreements for
fear of negative repercussions on their immigration status or the immigration status of their
family. See id. at 61.
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Despite the widespread criticism of the § 287(g) program, it does not
appear that Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano intends to heed
the call of civil rights activists to put an end to the program.137 Although ICE
has taken small steps toward possibly reforming federal oversight of
jurisdictions participating in § 287(g)—such as the recent revocation of Sheriff
Joe Arpaio’s task-force authority under his MOA with ICE in October
2009138—the fact remains that more than half of the 67139 jurisdictions
throughout the country are currently enforcing immigration law under 287(g)
are participating in the task-force model, with no end in sight.140
2. The Jail Model
Less controversial than the task-force model is the jail model provision of
the 287(g) program.141 While the jail model has not received as much criticism
as the task-force model—due in large part to the absence of the inflammatory
racial profiling allegations that have plagued the task-force model142—the jail
model nonetheless deserves attention. I argue that, although the jail model may
at first blush seem more innocuous than the task-force model, the jail model is
in reality a more effective form of “devolution”143 of the federal immigration
power to state and local law enforcement authorities than the task-force model.
While the jail model relies on actual ICE agents to determine the immigration

137. See, e.g., Janet Napolitano, Prepared Remarks by Secretary Napolitano on Immigration
Reform at the Center for American Progress (Nov. 13, 2009), http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/
speeches/sp_1258123461050.shtm (discussing plans for immigration reform in the Obama
administration, which includes an increased focus on enforcement, but no mention of reform of
the 287(g) program).
138. See, e.g., Gary Grado, Feds Strip Arpaio of Immigration Authority, THE E. VALLEY
TRIB. (Mesa, Ariz.), Oct. 7, 2009, at A4, available at 2009 WLNR 19767953.
139. This figure is current as of October 2009. See News Release, U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, ICE Announces Standardized 287(g) Agreements with 67 State and Local
Law Enforcement Partners (Oct. 16, 2009) http://www.ice.gov/pi/nr/0910/091016washington
dc.htm [hereinafter USICE News Release].
140. See U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, DELEGATION OF IMMIGRATION
AUTHORITY SECTION 287(G) IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT (Aug. 18, 2008),
http://www.ice.gov/partners/287g/Section287_g.htm (featuring a list of participating 287(g)
jurisdictions, including type of agreement) [hereinafter USICE Immigration Authority].
Although DHS stopped entering into § 287(g) MOAs with new jurisdictions in 2008, agreements
with existing jurisdictions that were set to expire have been renewed, and DHS has issued new
guidelines expanding the program under the Obama Administration. See Michelle Waslin, Policy
or Politics? DHS Changes and Expands 287(g) Program, DICK & SHARON’S L.A. PROGRESSIVE,
July 19, 2009, http://www.laprogressive.com/2009/07/16/policy-or-politics-dhs-changes-andexpands-287g-program.
141. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 287(g), 8 U.S.C. 1357 (2006).
142. See SHAHANI & GREENE, supra note 126, at 36.
143. See Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration Power,
Equal Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493, 493 (2001).
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status of persons who have already been detained pursuant to violations of
state or local law—rather than relying on cross-deputized police officers
making such determinations in the field—the danger of the jail model lies in its
broad reach and wide scope.144
What makes the jail model such an effective form of immigration
devolution is its ability to check the immigration status of virtually every
person who is arrested and booked into a jail facility in a jurisdiction that has
an MOA with ICE under § 287(g).145 While state and local governments are
encouraged—and perhaps required146—to cooperate with federal immigration
authorities to determine the immigration status of alleged criminals in their
custody who may be subject to removal, it is quite another thing to station ICE
agents in local jails who check the immigration status of all persons who are
determined to be foreign-born during the booking procedure.147
The jail model continues to be in widespread use across the country by
jurisdictions who are participating in the § 287(g) program, either alone or in
connection with the task-force model.148 In fact, screening individuals to
determine their immigration status at the time of booking into local jails is
becoming more common as ICE has also rolled out the Criminal Alien
Program (CAP)149 in addition to the § 287(g) jail model. These programs,
which have shifted detection and identification of undocumented persons from
federal agencies to local law enforcement, represent how immigration
federalism is currently devolving on a practical, every day level—not merely a
theoretical level—and need to be halted if there is to be meaningful
comprehensive immigration reform under Obama.

144. For a discussion of two large jurisdictions that have jail model MOAs with ICE under §
287(g) and their impact on the local communities—Orange County, California and Los Angeles
County, California—see ELIZABETH VENABLE, COAL. FOR HUMANE IMMIGRANT RIGHTS OF L.
A., LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AND IMMIGRATION: THE 287(G) PROGRAM IN SOUTHERN
CALIFORNIA (Nov. 2008), http://chirla.org/files/287g%20Factsheet%2011-24-08.pdf.
145. See USICE News Release, supra note 139 (describing the Jail Model and the role of Jail
Enforcement Officers).
146. See 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (2006) (federal statute providing for communication between
government agencies and federal immigration authorities).
147. See USICE News Release, supra note 139 (“Jail Enforcement Officers . . . identify aliens
already incarcerated within their detention facilities who are eligible for removal”).
148. See USICE Immigration Authority, supra note 140 (list of 287(g) jurisdictions and type
of agreements).
149. See U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, CRIMINAL ALIEN PROGRAM
(Nov. 19, 2008), http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/factsheets/criminal_alien_program.htm.
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3. Maricopa County, Arizona—A Case Study in the Abuse of the 287(g)
Program
Proponents of the § 287(g) program argue that the problems that have
arisen are not due to lack of proper oversight by DHS and ICE, but rather
improper enforcement of the program by overzealous local law enforcement
agencies.150 Supporters of § 287(g) correctly point out that, under their MOAs,
participating jurisdictions should not inquire about the immigration status of
individuals unless they are detained for something that is “more than a routine
traffic stop.”151 However, the failure of the federal agencies to adequately
communicate with participating jurisdictions regarding the scope of their
authority under § 287(g)—and their inability or unwillingness to hold
jurisdictions who overstep their bounds accountable—has led to a lack of
uniformity and serious problems with fair and just enforcement of the program
nationwide.
Although many jurisdictions that have entered into 287(g) agreements with
DHS have come under scrutiny for uneven enforcement and allegations of
racial profiling,152 none have been subject to more scrutiny, criticism, and
charges of civil rights violations than the Sheriff’s Office in Maricopa County,
Arizona.153 Under the leadership of Sheriff Joe Arpaio—a public official who
won his fourth-straight election in November 2008 with 55% of the votes154—
the MSCO’s 287(g) agreement has literally become the poster-child for the
abuses inherent in the 287(g) program.155 From his repeated insistence that he
does not need the 287(g) agreement to enforce civil immigration laws,156 to his

150. See ANITA KHASHU, POLICE FOUND., THE ROLE OF LOCAL POLICE: STRIKING A
BALANCE BETWEEN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 26–27 (Apr. 2009),
http://www.policefoundation.org/pdf/strikingabalance/Role%20of%20Local%20Police.pdf.
151. See, e.g., Memorandum of Agreement, supra note 125.
152. See SHAHANI & GREENE, supra note 126, at 36.
153. There have been a plethora of media and other reports documenting the outrageous and
often overtly racist actions of the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office. See, e.g., William Finnegan,
Sheriff Joe, THE NEW YORKER, JULY 20, 2009, at 42.
154. See J.J. Hensley, Poll: 61% of Voters in Arizona Approve of Arpaio’s Job Approach,
ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Oct. 28, 2009, http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/2009/10/28/20091028
bigbrother1028side.html.
155. For example, recent congressional hearings examining whether the 287(g) program
encourages racial profiling by local law-enforcement officials focused heavily on the actions of
Sheriff Arpaio and his deputies. See, e.g., The Justice Department: Hearing Before the H.
Judiciary Comm., 111th Cong. 47 (May 13, 2010) (LEXIS, Federal News Service) (Attorney
General Eric Holder commenting that the Department of Justice is currently investigating claims
against Sheriff Arpaio of civil-rights violations).
156. Sheriff Arpaio has repeatedly asserted that he may stop, question, and detain persons on
the basis of determining their immigration status alone as part of his authority to enforce the state
human smuggling law. See infra Part II.B.3.
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“Illegal Immigration Interdiction Unit” (also known as the “Triple I Unit),”157
to the “crime-suppression sweeps” that he has used to terrorize the Latino
residents of Maricopa County over the last several years—often with the
assistance of his “posse” of vigilantes, many of whom have white supremacist
ties158—Sheriff Arpaio’s abuse of MCSO’s 287(g) agreement with DHS is a
cautionary tale of the dangers of delegating local law enforcement and
permitting them to act as ICE officials without adequate training or oversight.
Arguably the most egregious conduct that Sheriff Arpaio and his deputies
have engaged in pursuant their § 287(g) authority are the “crime suppression
sweeps” that have become a routine matter in Latino neighborhoods in
Maricopa County over the last several years.159 These checkpoints and
blockades, which have been set up all over the county with the express purpose
of detaining “illegals,”160 have resulted in persons of Latino heritage being
stopped, detained, and arrested—usually for civil immigration status
violations—on the pretext of offenses such as “improper use of a horn.”161
Persons have been stopped and detained for doing nothing more than walking
on the sidewalk,162 or for having the bad luck to be dropping a parent off at

157. See Editorial, Arpaio’s Illegal Immigration Policy Isn’t Worth Cost,
WESTVALLEYEDITORIALS BLOG, Dec. 12, 2007, http://www.azcentral.com/members/Blog/West
ValleyEditorials/12542 (discussing the role of the Illegal Immigration Interdiction Unit in
Maricopa County’s crime suppression sweeps).
158. See Andrea Nill, Sheriff Joe Arpaio to Recruit and Arm Citizens, Neo-Nazis “Have His
Back”, IMMIGRATION IMPACT, May 8, 2009, http://immigrationimpact.com/2009/05/08/joearpaio-neo-nazi-posse.
159. In the last several years, Sheriff Arpaio has been conducting immigration raids, which
his office refers to as “crime suppression sweeps,” throughout Maricopa County. See Dennis
Wagner, Impact of Arpaio’s Sweeps Is Unclear, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, October 4, 2008, at A1,
available
at
http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/2008/10/04/20081004arpaio-sweeps10
04.html.
160. See, e.g., News Release, Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office, Weekend Crime Suppression
Operation Concludes: Deputies Turn Over 19 Suspected Illegal Immigrants to Federal Authorities
Without Incident (Oct. 19, 2009), http://www.mcso.org/include/pr_pdf/10-19-2009%20News%20
Release.pdf.
161. A U.S. citizen who was detained in the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office sweep in May
2008 in Guadalupe, Arizona—a town that is one square mile and whose population is 100%
ethnic minority (Yacqui Indian and Latino)—was stopped and questioned about his immigration
status on this basis. See Stephen Lemons, Guadalupe Made it Clear that Joe Arpaio’s Attacking
Anyone with Brown Skin, PHOENIX NEW TIMES, May 29, 2008, http://www.phoenixnewtimes.
com/2008-05-29/news/guadalupe-made-it-clear-that-joe-arpaio-s-attacking-anyone-with-brownskin.
162. Julio Mora, a U.S. citizen, and his father, a legal permanent resident, were detained for
hours pursuant to one of Sheriff Arpaio’s sweeps of a landscaping business, Handyman
Maintenance, Inc., in February 2009. The Moras have since filed a lawsuit alleging violations of
their civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that they were detained simply because they
were Latino. See Stephen Lemons, Joe Arpaio vs. ACLU: New Lawsuit Tomorrow over Worksite
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work on the day of one of Sheriff Arpaio’s sweeps.163 These raids have
created a palpable climate of fear in Maricopa County that can be directly
traced to the federal government’s delegation of immigration enforcement
responsibilities to a local law enforcement agency that has neither the training,
nor the oversight, to carry out these functions properly.
A thorough treatment of the civil and human rights abuses that the
Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office has allegedly engaged in is beyond the scope
of this Article.164 However, when examining the ways in which Sheriff Arpaio
has seen fit to implement his authority under § 287(g) to question, detain, and
arrest persons solely for suspected civil immigration status violations, it is
important to note the way in which the Sheriff has relied upon Arizona state
law in accomplishing his goal of ridding Maricopa County of undocumented
persons. In particular, Sheriff Arpaio has used the statewide anti-immigrant
laws passed in recent years165 to create an environment where—in collusion
with the Maricopa County Attorney’s Office—persons who are alleged to be
undocumented immigrants are pretextually stopped, arrested, charged, and
detained based on little more than race, color, ethnicity, or national origin.166
As a result, Sheriff Arpaio has been subject to repeated allegations of racial

Raid, PHOENIX NEW TIMES, Aug. 18, 2009, http://blogs.phoenixnewtimes.com/bastard/2009/08/
sheriff_joe_arpaio_vs_aclu_new.php.
163. See Testimony of Julio Cesar Mora, Public Safety and Civil Rights Implications of State
and Local Enforcement of Immigration Laws: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration,
Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security and Int’l Law and the Subcomm. on the Const., Civil
Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 11 (2009) U.S. House
of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, Apr. 2, 2009, at 11, http://judiciary.house.gov/
hearings/printers/111th/111-19_48439.pdf.
164. The author is currently in the process of writing an Article dedicated solely to the battle
over immigration in the State of Arizona. The author hopes to publish the Article, Historic Police
Powers or State-Sanctioned Vigilantism? How Arizona Became Ground Zero for the
Immigrants’ Rights Movement and the Continuing Struggle for Latino Civil Rights in America,
sometime in 2010.
165. For a discussion of anti-immigrant laws in the State of Arizona, see supra Part I.
166. Details of the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office’s conduct that raise serious concerns
about racial profiling of Latinos can be found in the Pulitzer Prize winning five-part series
Reasonable Doubt. Ryan Gabrielson & Paul Giblin, Reasonable Doubt: Tribune Investigates
Sheriff’s Immigration Campaign: At What Cost?, E. VALLEY TRIB. (Mesa, Ariz.), July 9, 2008, at
A12. Additionally, a federal lawsuit against Maricopa County and the Maricopa County Sheriff’s
Office is currently pending in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, alleging
racial profiling on behalf of five individuals by the Sheriff’s Office based on their Latino
ethnicity. See Ortega-Melendres v. Arpaio, 598 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1029 (D. Ariz. 2009). The
plaintiffs’ motion for class certification was denied on August 24, 2009, with the court holding
that it a decision on the motion would be “premature.” See Ortega-Melendres v. Maricopa
County, No.CV-07-2513-PHX-GMS, 2009 WL 2707241, at *7 (D. Ariz. Aug. 24, 2009).
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profiling167 and has created a reign of terror for all Latinos in Maricopa
County—citizen and immigrant alike.168
B.

ICE Raids in the Bush Administration

Although the large-scale raids undertaken by ICE in the waning years of
the Bush Administration were not a devolution of immigration federalism in
the same way the 287(g) program is, I argue that these types of splashy—and
largely ineffective—enforcement-only tactics by ICE are the result of the
federal government’s recent laziness in exercising its plenary power over
immigration. That is, while Congress and the Executive could make much
more meaningful headway on immigration issues by pursuing comprehensive
immigration reform at the federal level and penalizing employers who are in
violation of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA),169 it has been
easier for them to delegate enforcement of immigration violations to local
authorities and conduct devastating raids on hard-working immigrants that do
nothing to solve our immigration problems, but give the appearance of being
tough on individuals who have committed the “crime” of working without
authorization.
While worksite raids were common in the Bush Administration, the
incident that has come to symbolize in the minds of many the tragedy as well
as the failure of enforcement-only immigration federalism is the Postville Raid
of 2008.170 The worksite raid at Agriprocessors, Inc., in Postville, Iowa was a
devastating and unprecedented event in immigration enforcement in United
States immigration policy, both for the employer and the employees who were
caught up in the federal government’s dragnet. What sets the Postville raid
apart from other ICE raids, both before and since, is the novel theory used by
the United States Attorney’s Office of the Northern District of Iowa against the
employees who were detained in the raid—the use of their prosecutorial

167. See Gabrielson & Giblin, supra note 166.
168. Sheriff Arpaio’s deputies are alleged to routinely stop and detain U.S. citizens of Latino
heritage based on nothing more than their ethnicity. For example, four of the five named
plaintiffs in Ortega-Melendres are U.S. citizens who alleged that they were racially profiled by
the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office. See Ortega-Melendres, 598 F. Supp. 2d at 1030.
169. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359
(codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
170. Federal immigration authorities raided a plant operated by Agriprocessors, Inc., on May
12, 2008, in Postville, Iowa, charging hundreds of undocumented workers with aggravated
identity theft in order to procure guilty pleas from the workers. For a summary of the events at
Postville and criticism of the actions taken by the government, see generally Julia Preston, An
Interpreter Speaking Up for Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2008, at A1; abUSed—The
Postville Raid (Internet video), Oct. 2008, http://www.abusedthepostvilleraid.com.
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discretion to charge hundreds of undocumented persons with identity theft
under federal criminal law.171
Most of the persons charged pursuant to the Postville raids served five
months in federal prison and were then deported.172 However, the egregious
due process violations that were noted by attorneys and advocates for the
immigrants workers caught up in the Postville raid,173 as well as the United
States Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Flores-Figueroa v. United
States174 clarifying under what circumstances prosecutors may charge certain
individuals with “aggravated identity theft,”175 were a watershed moment
regarding how ICE and local prosecutors carry out worksite raids.176 While
Secretary Napolitano has not indicated that worksite raids will cease
completely—and indeed, raids have continued under the Obama
Administration177—the lessons learned from the Postville raid make it unlikely
that such aggressive enforcement of IRCA violations will continue now that
the Bush Administration has come to an end.

171. See, e.g., Jens Manuel Krogstad, Harkin’s Nominee for U.S. Attorney Under Fire for
Role in Postville Raid, THE COURIER (Waterloo, Iowa), Apr. 5, 2009, at A1, available at
http://www.wcfcourier.com/news/politics/article_546da03d-18c5-51b0-a3ef-7ba0c644eb22.html.
172. See Nigel Duara, William Petroski & Grant Shulte, Claims of ID Fraud Lead to Largest
Raid in State History, DES MOINES REG., May 12, 2008, available at http://www.desmoines
register.com/article/20080512/NEWS/80512012/Claims-of-ID-fraud-lead-to-largest-raid-in-statehistory.
173. See, e.g., Erik Camayd-Freixas, Interpreting the Largest ICE Raid in History: A
Personal Account, June 13, 2008, at 3–4, http://graphics8.nytimes.com/images/2008/07/14/
opinion/14ed-camayd.pdf.
Dr. Camayd-Friexas, a Professor of Interpreting at Florida
International University, served as an interpreter for many of the detained Postville workers and
has been extremely critical of the tactics taken by the government in the Postville raid.
174. Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1886 (2009).
175. Flores-Figueroa involved a challenge to a defendant’s conviction for aggravated identify
theft, and the accompanying mandatory minimum sentence of two years, as applied to an
individual whose false social security number did not actually belong to another person. The U.S.
Attorney in the Northern District of Iowa charged all the persons detained in the Postville raid
with aggravated identity theft in order to procure guilty pleas from the defendants, regardless of
the underlying facts of how they obtained their false documentation and their individual levels of
knowledge. In a 9-0 decision, the Court held that in order for the government to obtain a
conviction for aggravated identity theft, the prosecution had to prove that the defendants
“knowingly” used the identity information of an actual individual. See id. at 1894.
176. The former executive of Agriprocessors, Inc., Sholom Rubashkin, was subsequently
prosecuted criminally in connection with his management of the Postville meat-packing plant.
On November 12, 2009, he was found guilty of 86 counts of bank fraud, and potentially faces life
in prison. Mr. Rubaskin also faces another trial in South Dakota in December 2009 for alleged
immigration violations. See Nathaniel Popper, Former Agriprocessors CEO Rubashkin Sent to
Prison, THE JEWISH DAILY FORWARD, Nov. 18, 2009, http://www.forward.com/articles/119188/.
177. See, e.g., Lornet Turnbull, Immigration Officials Raid Bellingham Plant, THE SEATTLE
TIMES, Feb. 24, 2009, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2008781541_webraid
24m.html.
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C. The Increase of Hate Crimes Against Immigrants and Latinos in the 2000s
In the wake of the stepped-up enforcement against undocumented
immigrants by the Bush Administration, and the increasing reliance on state
and local law enforcement agencies to enforce federal immigration law, the
debate surrounding immigration took a tragic—though I argue, not
unforeseeable—turn as the rhetoric often used by immigration restrictionists
became the calling card of hate against immigrants, Latinos, and other groups
that are easily targeted as potentially “foreign.”178 Although hate crimes
against persons of color did, unfortunately, occur prior to the rise of
inflammatory immigration rhetoric, it is nearly impossible to deny that the
sharp spike in hate crimes against Latinos—a 40% increase between 2003 and
2007179—is not somehow connected to the often racist and xenophobic
undertones that arise in the immigration debate.180
A recent hate crime that had overtly racist overtones against a Latino
immigrant was the murder of Luis Ramirez in 2008 in Shenandoah,
Pennsylvania,181 which is not too far from the infamous Hazleton,
Pennsylvania.182 Ramirez, an undocumented Mexican national who had lived
in Shenandoah for several years with his fiancé and their children, was
murdered by three White high-school students following a confrontation late
one night in July 2008.183 Although the overtly racist elements of the murder
were undisputed—the students admitted to uttering racial slurs as they hit,
kicked, punched, and stomped Ramirez to death184—the students were not

178. See Hatewatch, Anti-Latino Hate Crimes Rise for Fourth Year in a Row, S. POVERTY L.
CENTER, Oct. 29, 2008, http://www.splcenter.org/blog/2008/10/29/anti-latino-hate-crimes-risefor-fourth-year.
179. Id.
180. Overtly racist commentary directed toward Latinos—particularly Mexicans—can
generally be found in the comments section of any major online newspaper article discussing
immigration or immigration reform. See, e.g., Linda Valdez, Arizona: Give Amnesty to Migrants,
ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Aug. 27, 2007, http://www.azcentral.com/members/Blog/Valdez/6002 (see
comments section) (last visited Feb. 9, 2010). However, for a more thorough analysis of the link
between anti-immigrant sentiment and hate crimes, see Anti-Defamation League, Immigration
Reports and Resources, http://www.adl.org/civil_rights/immigration.asp (last visited Feb. 9,
2010).
181. See, e.g., Sean D. Hamill, Mexican’s Death Bares a Town’s Ethnic Tension, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 5, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/05/us/05attack.html.
182. For a discussion on Hazleton, see supra Part I.
183. See Hamill, supra note 181.
184. See, e.g., Emanuella Grinberg, Some Satisfied, Others Outraged with Verdict for
Immigrant’s Death, CNN, May 3, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/05/02/pa.immigrant.
beating/index.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2010).
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charged with a hate crime185 and were ultimately acquitted of murder by an allWhite jury.186
Unfortunately, Luis Ramirez is not the only Latino immigrant who lost his
life as a result of xenophobic furor.187 Although the United States Department
of Justice is investigating the murder of Luis Ramirez and other Latinos as hate
crimes,188 there is still a great deal of fear in the immigrant and Latino
community not only of becoming a target of a racially-motivated crime, but
also of potentially being subject to negative immigration consequences for
reporting criminal activity.189
III. THE PLENARY POWER DOCTRINE VS. STATE POLICE POWER: WHAT
CONGRESS AND THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION MUST DO TO ACCOMPLISH
MEANINGFUL IMMIGRATION REFORM
A.

Congress’s Plenary Power to Regulate Immigration

In the wake of what Professor Michael Wishnie has called the “devolution”
of the federal immigration power,190 and the subsequent resurgence of the state
and local immigration regulations discussed in Part I, there has been an
increasingly lively conversation among immigration law scholars regarding the
constitutionality of immigration federalism and how far the plenary power
doctrine extends.191 As has been noted, it has long been accepted that

185. One of the youths, Colin Walsh, pleaded guilty to violating Mr. Ramirez’s civil rights in
federal court and testified against the other alleged killers in the state prosecution. See Michael
Rubinkam, Luis Ramirez Killers Found Not Guilty After Beating Mexican Immigrant to Death,
HUFFINGTON POST, May 2, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/05/04/luis-ramirezkillers-foun_n_195535.html.
186. See Grinberg, supra note 184.
187. Other Latinos whose deaths are being investigated as hate crimes include Marcelo
Lucero, 37, an Ecuadoran immigrant who was murdered by teenagers looking for “beaners” in
Patchogue, New York on Nov. 8, 2008; Wilter Sanchez, beaten and then run over in New Jersey
on January 21, 2009; and José Sucuzhañay, murdered on December 9, 2008, by individuals
yelling racist and anti-gay slurs in New York. See Ramona E. Romero & Cristóbal Josh Alex,
Hispanic Groups Angered by Immigrant Hate Crimes, LATINO J., Jan. 26, 2009, http://thelatino
journal.blogspot.com/2009/01/hispanic-groups-angered-by-immigrant.html.
188. See Frank Eltman, After Immigrant Killed in NY, Others Tell of Abuse, ABC NEWS, Nov.
7, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=9021630.
189. Id. (reporting that “many victims had always been reluctant to contact police, fearing
they would be asked about their immigration status”).
190. See Wishnie, supra note 143, at 512.
191. See, e.g., Clare Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration Federalism,
61 VAND. L. REV. 787, 807 (2008) (reexamining the constitutionality of federal exclusivity to
regulate immigration); Rodríguez, supra note 6, at 575–76 (arguing that localities may
constitutionally play a role in immigration law and policy and the potential benefits that can flow
from such regulation); Michael J. Wishnie, State and Local Police Enforcement of Immigration
Laws, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1084, 1088–95 (arguing that the federal government has the exclusive
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immigration law is primarily, if not exclusively, within the province of the
federal government.192 However, there is also a long history of state regulation
of immigration that arises from their inherent police powers.193 As a result, the
lines between where federal dominance of immigration regulation ends, and
the states’ authority to regulate immigration pursuant to their legitimate
interests begins, has become increasingly blurry as time goes on.
1. The Doctrine of Immigration Federalism
The word “immigration” does not appear anywhere in the United States
Constitution. The only power expressly delegated to Congress in the
Constitution concerning immigration is the authority to “establish a[n] uniform
Rule of Naturalization.”194 However, it is well-settled that the federal
government has the power to regulate the admission of aliens to this country,
as well as the power to exclude and remove them if they see fit.195 This is
because, despite the lack of express authority in the Constitution giving the
political branches the power to regulate immigration, the federal courts have
consistently held that Congress has “plenary power” to regulate
immigration.196
Congress’s plenary power to regulate immigration is an expansive doctrine
that was first announced by the United States Supreme Court in The Chinese
Exclusion Case.197 In that case, the Court rejected the claim by a Chinese
laborer, Chae Chan Ping, that his exclusion from the United States on the basis
of his race violated the Constitution.198 In holding that Congress has the power
to exclude aliens on any basis it sees fit—including race—the Court stated:
Whatever license . . . Chinese laborers may have obtained, previous to the
act of October 1, 1888, to return to the United States after their departure, is
held at the will of the government, revocable at any time, at its pleasure.
Whether a proper consideration by our government of its previous laws . . .

authority to regulate immigration); Huyen Pham, The Constitutional Right Not to Cooperate?
Local Sovereignty and the Federal Immigration Power, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1373, 1400–01 (2006)
(same).
192. See Chae Chan Ping & Fong Yue Ting, The Origins of Plenary Power, in IMMIGRATION
LAW STORIES 7 (David A. Martin and Peter H. Schuck ed., 2005).
193. See Gerald L. Neuman, A Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776-1875), 93
COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1866–67 (1993).
194. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
195. See, e.g., Adam B. Cox & Cristina Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119
YALE L.J. 458 (2010).
196. See Ping & Ting, supra note 192.
197. See generally Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
198. Id. at 611.
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ought to have qualified its inhibition . . . are not questions for judicial
determination.199
Thus, The Chinese Exclusion Case is notable for announcing the plenary
power doctrine, holding that regulation of immigration is exclusively within
the province of the political branches of the federal government, and that the
decisions made by Congress and the Executive regarding whom to admit and
whom to exclude.200
Since The Chinese Exclusion Case, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
reaffirmed the federal government’s sovereignty over immigration.201 The
Supreme Court has also weighed in rather forcefully regarding the proper role
of the states in immigration regulation, stating in United States v. Pink202 that
“[p]ower over external affairs is not shared by the States; it is vested in the
national government exclusively.”203 In Harisades v. Shaughnessy,204 the
Supreme Court broadly categorized Congress’s plenary power to regulate
immigration as concerning “any policy toward aliens.”205 However, despite
the unquestionable Supremacy of federal law in immigration matters, the fact
remains that the states’ historic police powers to regulate in other areas
traditionally reserved to them often complicates the question of when a
permissible regulation of aliens by a state becomes an impermissible regulation
of immigration law.206 This has led, perhaps inevitably, to the conflict between
state and federal regulation of immigration that we face today.
B.

The States’ Historic Police Powers Concerning Immigration
1. Early Interpretations of the States’ Immigration Powers

Although the Constitution expressly grants Congress the regulate
naturalization—and therefore, impliedly, immigration—Congress did not see
fit to establish uniform regulations governing immigration until the late
nineteenth century.207 In fact, it appears that the framers of the Constitution
left laws regulating the exclusion of aliens to the several states, while the
federal government itself maintained what was more or less an “open borders”

199. Id. at 609.
200. See, e.g., Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary
Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255.
201. See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
202. 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
203. Id. at 233.
204. 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
205. Id. at 588.
206. As the U.S. Supreme Court has stated, not every regulation of aliens is a regulation of
immigration. See De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 355 (1976).
207. See Neuman, supra note 193, at 1866–67.
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immigration policy.208 In fact, prior to Congress’s passage of laws regulating
immigration at the federal level in 1875,209 it was commonplace for the States
to have their own laws and policies regulating who could remain within their
territories.210
However, despite the fact that the States had an early role in regulating
immigration, once the federal government stepped in and asserted its authority
over immigration, the States were generally reluctant to challenge that scheme.
While the view that the States retain some inherent authority to regulate
immigration would arise occasionally over the next century, 211 the prevailing
doctrine of Congress’s plenary power to regulate immigration largely
prevented States from attempting to pass their own immigration laws
independent of the federal government.212 It was not until the late twentieth
century that, once again, the States began to assert that their historic police
powers not only permit, but require the federal government to defer to the
States on certain matters pertaining to aliens within their borders, such as
education and employment.213
2. Modern Interpretations of the States’ Authority to Regulate
Immigration
Because of what Professor Neuman calls the “lost century” of American
immigration law,214 in which the federal government had virtually no role
concerning the regulation of immigration, the debate regarding the proper role
of states in modern immigration law and policy rages on to this day. While the
INA has been amended countless times since its creation in 1952,215 Congress
has, in general, said precious little about where the federal power to regulate
immigration ends and the states’ historic police power to govern their affairs
by regulating the activities of immigrants within their jurisdiction begins.

208. See Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories,
and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power Over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1,
81 (2002).
209. See Neuman, supra note 193, at 1834.
210. See Rodríguez, supra note 6, at 611−14.
211. See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
212. Id.
213. See, e.g., Kris W. Kobach, The Quintessential Force Multiplier: The Inherent Authority
of Local Police to Make Immigration Arrests, 69 ALB. L. REV. 179 (2005) (arguing that the
federal government only has enumerated powers, and because immigration regulation is not
expressly enumerated in the Constitution as a federal power, it is left to the states to regulate the
activities of immigrants within their borders).
214. See Neuman, supra note 193, at 1834.
215. The most recent—and sweeping—revision of the INA occurred in 1996. See Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA) of 1996, Pub. L. 104-208, 110
Stat. 3009-546 (1996).
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Perhaps the area in which the line between state and federal regulation of
immigration is the most blurred concerns the employment of undocumented
immigrants. In 1976, the United States Supreme Court held in De Canas v.
Bica that California’s state law regulating the employment of unauthorized
aliens was not preempted under federal law.216 The decision in De Canas,
which held that it was within the states’ historic police power to regulate the
employment of undocumented immigrants, was controlling precedent for the
next decade.217 Then, in 1986, Congress passed the Immigration Reform and
Control Act (IRCA),218 which made the employment of unauthorized workers
“central to ‘[t]he policy of immigration law.’”219 Therefore, in light of
Congress’s action, the conventional wisdom since the implementation of IRCA
had been that since Congress had enacted a comprehensive federal scheme
regulating the employment of aliens, the states no longer had the authority to
enact laws like the one upheld in De Canas because they would now be
preempted under federal law except in limited circumstances.220
However, in September 2008, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit held that Arizona’s state employer sanctions law was not
preempted under the Supremacy Clause because “the power to regulate the
employment of unauthorized aliens remains within the states’ historic police
powers.”221 Although the plaintiffs have petitioned the United States Supreme
Court for a writ of certiorari,222 this decision by the Ninth Circuit has cast
serious doubt on the proper role of the States in the enforcement of
immigration law post-IRCA, particularly in the area of regulating employment
of undocumented immigrants.
Another area in which the United States Supreme Court has weighed in on
the battle between state and federal regulation of undocumented aliens is
education. Following its decision in De Canas, in 1982 the United States
Supreme Court struck down a Texas statute that prohibited undocumented
immigrant children from receiving free primary and secondary education at the

216. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 355−56 (1976).
217. Id. at 357.
218. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986).
219. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 147 (2002) (quoting INS v.
Nat’l Ctr. for Immigrants’ Rights, Inc., 502 U.S. 183, 194 n.8 (1991)).
220. IRCA contains several “savings clauses” that permit the states to regulate immigration in
a limited fashion. The most prominent saving clause, which carves out an exception for states
that permits them to regulate employment through “licensing or similar laws,” is contained in §
1324(a)(h)(2), and has been the catalyst for a great deal of litigation in the last several years. See
supra Part I.B.
221. Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856, 865 (9th Cir. 2009).
222. See supra note 122 (discussing the status of the petition in United States Chamber of
Commerce v. Candelaria).
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state’s expense in Plyler v. Doe.223 In its holding, the Plyler Court stated that
“the States do have some authority to act with respect to illegal aliens, at least
where such action mirrors federal objectives and furthers a legitimate state
goal.”224 However, the majority held that States did not have the authority to
deny undocumented immigrant children the right to an education on equal
protection grounds, despite the fact that they also explicitly held found that
Texas had a legitimate state interest in attempting to mitigate the financial
burden imposed on the State by educating such children.225
The holding in Plyler has not yet been revisited by the Supreme Court, and
it continues to stand for the narrow proposition that undocumented children
may not be denied an education at public expense—despite the Court’s express
holding that education is not a fundamental right.226 Therefore, although some
States occasionally raise the idea of attempting to pass legislation prohibiting
undocumented children from receiving a free public education,227 unless and
until the Supreme Court overturns its decision in Plyler, it can safely be said
that the States may not restrict education to undocumented children as part of
their historic police powers.228
C. The Supremacy Clause and Preemption of State Regulation of
Immigration in the Obama Administration
1. The Role of the Executive in Immigration Regulation as a Matter of
Law, Not Policy
Although this article is critical of the enforcement-heavy immigration
229
policies of the Bush Administration,
it is a fact that the President has the
constitutional authority to enforce federal immigration laws in any manner he

223. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
224. Id. at 230.
225. Id. at 223, 228. The holding in Plyler, which was the result of a 5-4 split of the Court,
has been criticized as not grounded in law but as based on the Court’s attempt to avoid a result
that would have been a policy disaster.
226. Id. at 221, 227.
227. While not advocating for a complete ban against enrolling undocumented students in
public school, in April 2009, Pima County, Arizona Sheriff Clarence Dupnik opined that school
districts should check the citizenship of students before allowing them to enroll. See Pima
County Sheriff Calls for School Immigration Checks, ARIZ. REPUBLIC., Apr. 29, 2009,
http://www.azcentral.com/community/pinal/articles/2009/04/29/20090429SchoolChecks29ON.html.
228. There are, of course, persons who believe the decision in Plyer must be overturned, and
are hoping to bring a case that would ultimately reverse Plyler up to the Supreme Court. See,
e.g., David W. Stewart, Immigration and School Overcrowding, THE FED’N FOR AM. IMMIGR.
REFORM, Oct. 2, 2009, http://www.fairus.org/site/PageServer?pagename=iic_immigrationissue
centers51f8 (last visited Feb. 10, 2010).
229. See supra Part II.
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sees fit, so long as in doing so he does not frustrate the will of Congress.
Therefore, while I disagree with the immigration enforcement tactics taken by
the Bush Administration as a matter of policy, I do not believe it would have
been better to allow state and local governments to take immigration
enforcement matters into their own hands simply because they disagree with
the policy of the federal government. As stated repeatedly in this Article, I
believe that allowing the States to regulate immigration apart from or in
addition to the policies set by the federal government—either by being more
permissive or more restrictive—is not a constitutionally sound policy, and that
the Obama Administration should work with Congress to put an end to the
growing split of authority on this issue percolating in the federal courts by
amending the INA in the very near future.

In this respect, I want to emphasize the difference between affirmative
rejection of federal immigration law and policy by state and local
governments, as opposed to policy decisions made by local law enforcement
that are designed to reinforce federal immigration law. For example, there has
been much debate over so-called “sanctuary cities,” which are local
jurisdictions that have stated that they will not require or permit local law
enforcement officials to enforce federal immigration laws.231 Critics have
accused sanctuary cities of “flouting” federal immigration law, and contend
that they are merely the flip-side of the state and local anti-immigrant laws
described in Part I.232 In reality, however, the policies of these cities merely
reaffirm the proper lines between state and federal jurisdictions by refusing to
require or permit local law enforcement officers to act as federal immigration
agents without the training or jurisdiction to do so.233
Because these “sanctuary city” laws do not add or subtract to federal
immigration law—indeed, they do nothing more than restate what is required
under federal law—it cannot accurately be said that such laws must also be
preempted under the Supremacy Clause as impermissible regulations of
immigration. By contrast, the anti-immigrant laws passed by various states
and municipalities have, by and large, been substantive attempts to alter the
federal immigration laws set forth in the Immigration and Nationality Act
230. See, e.g., Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 195.
231. See, e.g., Kobach, supra note 213, at 206 (arguing that local governments are preempted
by federal law from enacting sanctuary or federal non-cooperation ordinances); Pham, supra note
191, at 1402–03 (arguing that the local governments should be permitted, as a matter of
sovereignty, to refuse to cooperate with federal immigration authorities).
232. See, e.g., Kobach, supra note 213, at 227.
233. See, e.g., Los Angeles Police Dept. Special Order 40, http://keepstuff.homestead.com/
Spec40orig.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2010). Special Order 40, which was implemented by
former Chief Darryl Gates, has been the policy of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD)
since 1979. Id. Special Order 40 states that LAPD officers have the responsibility to enforce
state and local law, not federal immigration law, and thus have no jurisdiction to arrest persons
for civil immigration violations. Id.
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(INA).234 As such, my argument that now is the critical time for the political
branches to reassert their dominance in the field of immigration regulation is
based on my belief in the principle of immigration federalism, and not on the
merits of the policies of either the Bush or Obama Administrations.235
2. Congress and the Obama Administration Must Act Now to Reassert
the Supremacy of Federal Immigration Law
I argue that the first step that must be taken by the Obama Administration
in order to reestablish the supremacy of the federal government in immigration
matters is to enact an immediate moratorium on the 287(g) program, and to
eventually abolish the program altogether.236 As discussed previously,237
although § 287(g) expressly provides that the federal government may delegate
some of its enforcement of immigration law to state and local law enforcement
through Memorandums of Agreements (MOA),238—formerly called
Memorandums of Understanding (MOU)239—I argue that § 287(g) needs to be
repealed in its entirety—not merely amended—in order to achieve the clarity
necessary on behalf of the federal government to wholly occupy the field of
immigration law and halt all state and local attempts to regulate immigration.
Beyond the repeal of § 287(g), I believe that meaningful comprehensive
immigration reform will require a complete a substantial overhaul of the INA
in its entirety, in a way that forcefully reasserts Congress’s plenary power to
regulate immigration. Historically, Congress has used to its plenary power to
regulate immigration through the INA not by giving more rights to immigrants,
but by restricting them.240 I argue that in light of the recent trend of some
courts to interpret the proper role of the states in immigration enforcement
broadly—that is, to focus on their historic police powers, rather than the
supremacy of the federal government in immigration matters—it is essential
that Congress amend the INA to expressly preempt state regulation of
immigration by the state in all matters. I suggest that rather than attempting to

234. See supra Part I.
235. Although I do, of course, hold opinions about the merits and morality of the policies of
both administrations. See infra Part II. See supra Part IV.
236. See supra Part II. Additionally, immigrants’ rights advocates and civil libertarians have
been calling for a moratorium on the 287(g) program for some time now. See, e.g., Raids on
Workers: Destroying Our Rights, NAT’L COMM’N ON ICE MISCONDUCT AND FOURTH
AMENDMENT VIOLATIONS, http://www.icemisconduct.org/docUploads/UFCW%20ICE%20rpt%
20FINAL%20150B_061809_130632.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2010).
237. See supra Part II.
238. See supra Part II.A.3 (exemplifying the pre-2009 § 287(g) MOA is the DHS’s agreement
with Maricopa County, Arizona).
239. See supra note 125.
240. See generally Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 195 (discussing Congress’s historical use of
the plenary power doctrine to regulate immigration).
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clean up poorly worded statutes, such as the infamously ambiguous “savings
clause” in the express preemption provision of 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(h)(2),241
Congress needs to simply write a new, catch-all provision of the INA that
clearly and succinctly draws the line between state and federal regulation of
immigration.
It is possible, of course, that in drawing a bright line between state and
federal authority to regulate immigration, that Congress may choose to expand
the parameters of what is currently believed to be the legitimate authority of
the states in this area. However, even if Congress chooses ultimately to
delegate its power in this manner, it will be preferable to having what we have
now—which is to say, a hodgepodge of various state and local regulations of
immigration, some of which have been held to conflict with federal
immigration laws and others which have not.
IV. DARING TO DREAM: A RE-INVENTION OF IMMIGRATION LAW AND POLICY
IN THE UNITED STATES
A.

The Promise of a New Day: Plenary Power, International Law, and
Comprehensive Immigration Reform in the Twenty-First Century

President Obama’s receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize in October 2009242
demonstrates, more than any of his other accomplishments to date, the
potential for radical change under his leadership and the hope that his
Presidency embodies not just within our nation, but worldwide. Although
critics have charged that this prestigious honor was prematurely bestowed on
the President243—that he has not yet done anything to merit such recognition
less than a year into his Presidency—others see the Nobel Peace Prize as a vote
of confidence in President Obama’s ability to be a global leader and innovator
of change. It is almost certain that one of the areas in which the world wants—
and needs—to see President Obama pursue peace is one of the most pressing
issues of our time: international immigration and migration.
While the plenary power to regulate immigration has traditionally been
viewed by both Congress and the Executive as an insular act of foreign

241. Interpretation of this statute has been addressed by no less than three federal district
courts (W.D. Okla., M.D. Pa., and D. Ariz) and one federal appellate court (Ninth Circuit), while
two additional federal appellate courts (Tenth Circuit and Third Circuit) currently have the issue
under submission. See supra note 119.
242. See Nobel Peace Prize 2009 http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2009/
press.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2010).
243. See, e.g., Sam Stein, Obama’s Nobel Prize Inspires Conservative Outrage and
Confusion, HUFFINGTON POST, Oct. 9, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/10/09/obamas
-nobel-prize-inspir_n_315167.html (discussing sentiment that President Obama has not yet
accomplished anything in his short presidency that would merit the award of the Nobel Peace
Prize at this time) (last visited Feb. 10, 2010).
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sovereignty,244 increasing globalization has made it more and more difficult for
United States immigration policy to refrain from incorporating at least some
norms of international law into our domestic immigration laws.245 As a result,
immigrants’ rights advocates have for some time been calling for the United
States to draw more liberally from an international human rights perspective in
immigration law and policy, particularly as it pertains to the admission and
removal of immigrants.246 Unfortunately, fearing that such an expansion of
American immigration laws into the international realm might somehow
negatively impact our sovereignty either implicitly or explicitly,247 Congress
has thus far not chosen to amend the INA in a way that reflects many of the
precepts of international human rights law.248
In my opinion, however, a radical interpretation of the call to incorporate
international human rights into American immigration law and policy can be
reconciled with both the United States’ desire to control our sovereignty and
our need for comprehensive immigration reform. In fact, I believe that if there
is to be meaningful immigration reform at the federal level, the political
branches must do more than simply amend the INA—they must rewrite it to
reflect what is rapidly becoming the internationalization of immigration law
and policy within our borders. Thus, I propose that—borrowing from the
European Court of Justice’s doctrine of “freedom of movement”249—Congress
and the Executive use their plenary power to regulate immigration to
reconstruct our immigration laws and policies in a way that recognizes the
inherent human right of migration, puts a definitive end to the devolution of

244. See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889) (holding that the
federal government has the authority as a sovereign nation to regulate its borders and the
admission of persons into the interior).
245. For example, U.S. refugee and asylum law explicitly incorporates international treaties
and pronouncements into the Immigration and Nationality Act. See Immigration and Nationality
Act § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2008) (codifying asylum and refugee protections under U.S. law).
246. See Saby Ghoshray, Is There a Human-Rights Dimension to Immigration? Seeking
Clarity Through the Prism of Morality and Human Survival, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 1151, 1153
(2007).
247. There has been a great deal of paranoia that internationalization of our immigration laws
will cause the United States to follow the example of the European countries and unite with
Mexico and Canada to form a “North American Union.” See, e.g., Phillip Dine, Where Are They
Going with This?, SEATTLE TIMES, May 19, 2007, at A3, available at http://seattletimes.nw
source.com/html/nationworld/2003713518_rumor19.html.
248. In fact, Congress’s most recent comprehensive amendments to the INA in 1996 resulted
in the criminalization of more categories of immigrants, with harsher penalties for immigrations
convicted of relatively minor crimes, including deportation and mandatory detention pending
removal proceedings. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2008).
249. Europa.eu, Free Movement of Persons, Asylum, and Immigration, http://europa.eu/
legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/free_movement_of_persons_asylum_immigra
tion/index_en.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2010).
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immigration federalism, and moves the United States forward into the global
society we inhabit in the twenty-first century.
B.

Freedom of Movement and Common Immigration Policy in the European
Union and Meaningful Comprehensive Immigration Reform in the United
States

One of the central principles of the European Union is the directive
concerning the free movement of persons within the EU Member States.250
The European Union’s concept of “freedom of movement” began with an idea
that, upon reflection, seems rather modest—a commitment to the “freedom of
workers” in Europe to migrate in order to make a living and support their
families.251 However, it gradually expanded to cover the freedom of
movement of all persons within the EU in order to, among other things,
“provide a better definition of the status of family members and to limit the
scope for refusing entry or terminating the right of residence.”252
Out of this commitment to the freedom of movement for EU citizens has
grown a comprehensive plan for a common immigration policy for Europe for
members of non-EU Member Countries.253 While recognizing the differing
needs of the various member countries, the EU policy on immigration for its
member states strives toward a uniform system of immigration for its member
states and strives “to work towards making EU and national immigration
policies coherent and complementary,”254 and includes plans for addressing
entry and residence,255 illegal immigration,256 and return and expulsion.257
I propose that, for the Obama Administration to achieve meaningful
comprehensive immigration reform in the United States, our national

250. See Europa.eu, Right of Union Citizens and their Family Members to Move and Reside
Freely Within the Territory of the Member States, http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_
freedom_security/free_movement_of_persons_asylum_immigration/l33152_en.htm# (last visited
Feb. 10, 2010).
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. See Europa.eu, A Common Immigration Policy for Europe, http://europa.eu/legislation_
summaries/justice_freedom_security/free_movement_of_persons_asylum_immigration/jl0001_
en.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2010).
254. Id.
255. See Europa.eu, Uniform Format for Residence Permits, http://europa.eu/legislation_
summaries/justice_freedom_security/free_movement_of_persons_asylum_immigration/l33043_
en.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2010).
256. See Europa.eu, Policy Priorities in the Fight Against Immigration, http://europa.eu/
legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/free_movement_of_persons_asylum_immigra
tion/l14525_en.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2010).
257. See Europa.eu, Common Standards and Procedures for Returning Illegal Immigrants,
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/free_movement_of_persons_
asylum_immigration/jl0014_en.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2010).
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immigration policy must reflect the spirit embodied in both the EU principle of
freedom of movement for EU members countries and the common
immigration policy toward non-EU member states. Invoking the plenary power
doctrine to cause the States to recognize and respect the freedom of movement
of residents of other states—that is, to not allow the several States to create
their own barriers to movement of individuals by enacting independent
immigration laws—will put a halt to the state balkanization of immigration
regulations we have seen in the past decade. Additionally, adopting the EU
model of having the federal government create a comprehensive statement on
common immigration policies for the States will not only once again
reestablish Congress’s plenary power to regulate immigration, it will clearly
signal to the States that they are not permitted to adopt regulations of
immigration that conflict with the common immigration policies of the nation,
lest they be preempted by federal law.
While not a perfect solution to solving the immigration issue in the United
States, I believe that adopting the views of the European Union regarding the
inherent right of persons to move freely, and the importance of establishing a
common immigration policy among jurisdictions whose interests are
intertwined, can go a long way toward stopping the devolution of immigration
law and policy. I also think that clearly articulating a common immigration
policy at the federal level—which clearly sets the boundaries of the ability of
States to regulate in immigration matters—will mitigate much of ambiguity we
have seen through repeated and confusing amendments of the INA over the
years. Such a national statement on immigration policy can not only serve to
clarify our existing federal immigration law, but can also set aspirations for our
immigration law and policy as we move into the twenty-first century.
CONCLUSION
As President Obama told the nation when he was still Candidate Obama,
“Now is the time.”258 Now is the time not just for comprehensive immigration
reform at the federal level, but for humane, meaningful immigration reform
that respects the dignity of all persons and reflects both a knowledge and
embrace of international human rights law. The Obama Administration must
work with Congress now to craft a national immigration policy that embodies
not just the hope and promise of President Obama’s election, but the hope and
promise of our nation as a country of immigrants. Now is the time, for
immigrants and citizens alike, to go forward together into the 21st century to

258. Then-Senator Obama delivered a powerful speech during his run for President of the
United States at the Democratic National Convention in 2008 that subsequently come to be
known as the “Now Is the Time” speech. Barack Obama, Now Is the Time (Aug. 28, 2008),
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7587321.stm (full text of Obama’s speech accepting his
nomination as the Democratic Party candidate for President in the 2008 election).
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create a global immigration law and policy in the United States that reflects an
evolution—not a devolution—of the federal government’s power to establish
and enforce “a[] Uniform system of Naturalization”259 that fulfills the promise
of our great nation as a haven for persons the world over regardless of race,
color, ethnicity, or national origin. Putting an end to the patchwork of local
immigration laws that have sprung up in the last several years—while not the
solution to our myriad national immigration issues—is an important first step
toward rerouting United States immigration policy in the direction of
meaningful comprehensive immigration reform, which must occur at the
federal level.

259. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
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